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ABSTRACT
In his article The Blank Prose Crime of Aggression, Michael
Glennon argues that the International Criminal Court’s newly
adopted definition of the crime of aggression is so vague and
overbroad that prosecutions under it would violate the prohibition
on retroactive or ex post facto laws. His arguments rest on an
incorrect construction of the definition, ignorance of the extensive
negotiating history and travaux préparatoires that exist vis-à-vis the
crime, and failure to consult the elements of the crime. His
argument that the fact that past U.S. military action would be
covered by the definition shows the definition’s infirmity is
similarly flawed—again resting on fallacious interpretation of the
definition, as well as questionable logic. Many of his arguments
are also unduly alarmist because it is now clear that U.S. actions
will not be subject to ICC crime of aggression jurisdiction if and
when it is activated after January 1, 2017, because non-States
Parties to the Rome Statute (such as the U.S.) will be exempt from
such jurisdiction. Finally, his concerns about the role of the
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Security Council vis-à-vis aggression adjudications have now
largely been proven moot by the agreement reached at the
International Criminal Court’s Review Conference in Kampala,
Uganda. While Glennon’s article does raise interesting questions
about how the U.S. should view the finalization of the definition
and potential activation of jurisdiction, his failure to get more of
the details right obscures the discussion.
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In his article, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression,1 Michael
Glennon sounds unduly dire warning bells about what he
perceives are the defects of the International Criminal Court’s
newly adopted definition of the “crime of aggression.” While
Glennon claims that the definition violates the legal principle of
nullum crimen sine lege because it is impermissibly vague and its
imposition would thereby violate the prohibition on retroactive or
ex post facto laws, neither of these conclusions is correct. Glennon’s
protests are apparently disagreed with by at least eighty-four
delegations of legal advisors and experts from States Parties to the
Rome Statute2 of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),3
including many of the United States’ closest allies, who adopted
that definition of “crime of aggression” in Kampala, Uganda, at the
International Criminal Court’s first Review Conference (“Review
Conference”).4 Many of Glennon’s arguments are based on false

1 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L.
71, 72 (2010) (“[T]he proposed definition [of the crime of aggression] would
constitute a crime in blank prose—one that would run afoul of basic international
human rights norms and domestic guarantees of due process in its disregard of
the international principle of legality and related U.S. constitutional prohibitions
against vague and retroactive criminal punishment.”) (emphasis added). For
another article critical of Glennon’s article, see Ian Hurd, How Not to Argue Against
the Crime of Aggression: A Response to Michael Glennon 1, 6 (Buffett Ctr. for Int’l &
Comparative Studies, Working Paper No. 10-001, 2010), available at
http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/Buffett_10-001_
Hurd.pdf (arguing that Glennon fails to answer some basic questions in his
article, including whether “aggression [should] be a crime in international law or
not” or whether it should “be subject to individual criminal prosecution or not”
and concluding that “none of the difficulties that [Glennon] raises provides a
defensible argument against the project of criminalizing aggression”).
2 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 An estimated eighty-four States Parties attended. See Review Conference of
the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010, Delegations to the
Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, RC/INF.1
(Aug. 26, 2010), available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RCINF.1-reissued-ENG-FRA-SPA.pdf (listing the names of delegates from eightyfour States Parties and thirty-two non-States Parties attending the Review
Conference).
4 See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6,
Annex I, RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def.]. Article 123 of the Rome
Statute requests the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Review Conference to
consider amendments to the Statute seven years after its entry into force. See
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assumptions, errors of construction, or ignorance of the actual
extensive negotiating history regarding the ICC crime of
aggression. Other criticisms—for example, that “consensus” is not
possible as to the definition and conditions for ICC exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime5—have now been proven false by the
agreement reached to amend the Rome Statute at the Review
Conference in Kampala.
Glennon also appears to suggest that because past U.S. military
interventions, when measured against this definition, could
constitute the crime of aggression,6 there must be something wrong
with the definition. First, this logic is questionable. Second,
various situations Glennon examines (involving collective selfdefense, Chapter VII enforcement actions authorized by the
Security Council, or humanitarian interventions) would not be
covered by the definition. Third, his fear-mongering7 is based on
purely hypothetical arguments because past U.S. actions will not
be measured against the current definition, which will not apply
retroactively.8 Glennon’s concerns vis-à-vis the United States will
not come to pass for a fourth reason: when States Parties to the
Rome Statute (“States Parties”) reached agreement on the
conditions for the exercise of aggression jurisdiction, a clear
exemption from jurisdiction regarding crimes committed in the
territory of, or by nationals of, non-States Parties (including the
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 123, ¶ 1 (indicating that the conference would be
open to participants in the Assembly of States Parties, and review would include,
but would not be limited to, crimes under Rome Statute Article 5).
5 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98 (describing that a lack of consensus amongst
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression resulted in leaving the
decision of what the crime covered to the prosecutor and judges of the ICC and,
perhaps, the Security Council, only after the defendant’s conduct has occurred).
6 Id. at 90–94 (including the U.S. invasions in Iraq in 2003, in Afghanistan in
2001, in Panama in 1989, in Grenada in 1983, and in the Dominican Republic in
1965, and the use of force in Cambodia in 1970).
7 An example of such fear-mongering is the statement that “every U.S.
President since John F. Kennedy, hundreds of U.S. legislators and military leaders
. . . could have been subject to prosecution.” Glennon, supra note 1, at 73. As
explained below, the crime of aggression definition will not apply to past (or
future) U.S. leaders, and Glennon clearly over-construes the scope of the crime
when he suggests that hundreds of individuals would be covered. See infra note
195.
8 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (providing that no individual will
be criminally responsible under the Rome Statute for conduct prior to the entry
into force of the Statute).
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United States) was also agreed upon.9 Thus, U.S. nationals will be
exempt from aggression jurisdiction, even when it commences at
the earliest in 2017.10 Fifth, even if the United States were to
become a party to the Rome Statute (generally not considered
likely at the present time), its nationals could still avoid ICC
aggression jurisdiction if the United States exercises an “opt out”
declaration—another mechanism agreed upon at the Review
Conference.11 Therefore, the likelihood of Glennon’s fears coming
to pass vis-à-vis the United States and ICC prosecutions are
extremely remote.
Overall, Glennon’s article—while raising some interesting
questions—completely ignores any positive aspects of what was to
be accomplished at the Review Conference. The agreement
reached follows sound historical precedent set, inter alia, by the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact12 and 1945 U.N. Charter13 that there shall
9 See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5 (excluding ICC jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression if committed by a national of or on the territory of a state
that is not a party to the Statute). Glennon states that “U.S. military and political
leaders could still be prosecuted for the crime of aggression even if the United
States maintains its position [of] refusing to join.” Glennon, supra note 1, at 73.
This is simply not the case. The only (unlikely) scenario where U.S. military or
political leaders could be prosecuted before the ICC for the crime of aggression
would be if the United States were to permit such a referral by the U.N. Security
Council—something the United States could easily avoid by exercising its veto
power. See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter (permitting Security Council
referrals).
10 As explained infra note 50 and accompanying text, for the crime of
aggression to be prosecuted before the ICC, thirty States Parties would need to
ratify or accept the aggression amendment, one year would need to pass after the
thirtieth ratification, and an activation vote after January 1, 2017 “by the same
majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the
Statute” must be taken. New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 2–3 & art. 15 ter, ¶¶
2–3. See also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121, ¶ 3 (providing that amendments
to the Rome Statute may be passed by consensus or by two-thirds majority vote of
States Parties in either a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or a Review
Conference called by the Assembly).
11 See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 4. The author is not advocating
that course of conduct. It would be far preferable if the nationals of States Parties
do not commit acts that could be considered aggression and thus would have no
need to exercise opt out declarations.
12 The “Kellogg-Briand Pact” refers to the August 27, 1928 General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War, more generally known as the Pact of Paris or the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact condemned “recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies.” See General Treaty for the Renunciation of War art.
1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. For discussion of additional
precedent, see infra note 60.
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not be aggressive use of force by states. Additionally, it follows the
historical precedent set in large part by the United States, along
with other World War II allies, at the International Military
Tribunal for Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo),14 where “crimes against peace” were
prosecuted.15 One should not lose sight of what is at issue here:
attempting to deter aggressive use of force by states that is outside
the parameters of permissible action under the U.N. Charter, with
the goal of preventing the often massive death tolls and human
rights abuses that all too often ensue.16 States Parties in Kampala
13 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
14 The Tokyo Tribunal was dominated by the United States. The Nuremberg
Tribunal was originally established by the United States, United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union by the London Charter of the International Military
Tribunal in 1945. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, annexed
to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
London Charter] (establishing the laws and procedures for the Nuremberg
Tribunal). The Nuremberg Tribunal’s findings were more broadly endorsed. See
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946)
(affirming “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”); Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Principles of International
Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of
the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11 [¶¶ 97127] (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 374, 374-78, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/34 (summarizing the principals recognized in the charter and judgment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal).
15 See INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10, 29, 42 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf (last visited, Mar.
31, 2012) (describing various claims of crimes against peace brought at the
Nuremberg Tribunal). Such prosecutions also occurred pursuant to Control
Council Law No. 10. See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20,
1945) [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10], 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 1946, at 50.
16 Given the massive human rights violations that almost inevitably
accompany aggressive use of force, as discussed by this author more extensively
elsewhere, it is particularly regrettable that key human rights organizations such
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International did not play a more positive
role in the outcome of the Review Conference negotiations. See Jennifer Trahan,
The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala
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created a historic achievement, advancing the rule of law, when
they reached agreement on the definition of the crime of
aggression and conditions by which the ICC may in the future,
subject to certain procedural prerequisites, exercise jurisdiction
over the crime.
Section 1 of this Article provides a brief background on the
negotiations of the crime of aggression and an overview of the
agreement reached at the Review Conference.17 Section 2 then
examines Glennon’s arguments in depth. Specifically, Section 2.1.
examines his claims that application of the definition would violate
the principle of legality and the ban on retroactive application of
the laws; the Article concludes that the current definition shares
none of the flaws of the definitions used at the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, where such criticisms have often been leveled.
Section 2.2 examines Glennon’s claims that the fact that various
past military actions by the United States and other states could fall
within the definition suggests the definition is overbroad; the
argument rests on fallacious logic and various incorrect
applications of the definition.
Section 2.3 examines Glennon’s arguments about the role of the
Security Council—namely, his claim that involving the Security
Council in determining whether a prior state act of aggression has
occurred would be problematic, but not involving the Security
Council could violate the U.N. Charter.18 States Parties resolved
this once seemingly vexing problem at the Review Conference
Review Conference 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 51 n.15 (2011) [hereinafter Kampala
Negotiations]; see also Hans-Peter Kaul, Is It Possible to Prevent or Punish Future
Aggressive War-Making? at 1, 12-13 (Forum Int’l Criminal & Humanitarian Law
Occasional Paper Series No. 1, 2011), available at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/
fichl/documents/FICHL_OPS/FICHL_OPS_1_Kaul.pdf (calling on human rights
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to
reconsider their positions); Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 OXFORD J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE, issue 5, 1179,
1186 n.27 (2010) (calling for increased support from the NGO community for the
Kampala compromise).
17 For a more extensive background on the negotiations prior to the Review
Conference, see generally THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION:
MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION (Stefan
Barriga et al. eds., Liechtenstein Inst. on Self-Determination & Princeton U. 2009)
[hereinafter THE PRINCETON PROCESS]. For a summary of the earlier negotiations
and a detailed description of the Review Conference negotiations, see generally
Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16.
18 Glennon supra note 1, at 102.
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when they agreed on the conditions for the ICC’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The Security Council will
have the first option to make a determination that a state act of
aggression has occurred (or make a more generic referral of the
situation to the ICC);19 the ICC, however, will also be able to act on
its own—after referral by a State Party or the Prosecutor’s proprio
motu action and approval by the ICC Pre-Trial Division.20 This
solution, one that expert delegations from eighty-four States
Parties to the Rome Statute approved at the Review Conference, is
generally seen both to preserve the ICC’s independence and
recognize the important role of the Security Council. Finally,
Section 3 offers some concluding remarks about the successful
incorporation of the ICC definition of the crime of aggression into
the pantheon of crimes that the ICC, subject to additional
procedural hurdles being met, will be able to adjudicate in 2017.
1.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE
1.1. Historical Background
As suggested above, the idea of prosecuting the crime of
aggression is not a new concept.21 “Crimes against peace” were
prosecuted before the Nuremberg22 and Tokyo Tribunals,23 as well
New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter.
Id., art. 15 bis. The Pre-Trial Division would consist of an expanded PreTrial Chamber. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 39, ¶ 1 (“the Pre-Trial
Division [shall be composed] of not less than six judges”), with Rome Statute,
supra note 2, art. 39, ¶ 2(iii) (“The functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be
carried out either by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge of
that division . . . .”).
21 This Article only offers a brief summary of the background on the crime of
aggression negotiations, which are more extensively discussed elsewhere. See,
e.g., THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17; Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra
note 16.
22 The Nuremberg Tribunal was created by the four Allied Powers, and only
judges from those powers adjudicated cases. The Tribunal tried a total of twentytwo defendants, of whom nineteen were convicted, twelve of whom were
sentenced to death. For background on the Nuremberg Tribunal, see generally
MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1997).
23 The Tokyo Tribunal was created by Special Proclamation of U.S. General
Douglas MacArthur. See Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law:
19
20
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as under Control Council Law No. 10.24 The Nuremberg Tribunal
deemed such crimes to be “the supreme international crime
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself
the accumulated evil of the whole.”25 Indeed, the primary focus of
the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecutions was upon the crime of
aggressive war.26
While the U.N. Charter has as a core
foundational provision on the prohibition of aggressive use of
force, enshrined in Article 2(4),27 it does not define aggression to be
a crime. The Charter system of course envisioned replacing a
system of unilateral decisionmaking as to recourse to war with a
collective system,28 whereby armed force may only be used in self-

The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 373, 387–88 (1991). The judges hailed from eleven countries. See R. John
Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary
Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 27 (1995) (contrasting the composition of the court
in the Tokyo Trial to the court in the Nuremberg Trial). The Tokyo Tribunal tried
twenty-eight defendants, of whom seven were sentenced to death and eighteen to
prison terms; two died during trial and one was found mentally incompetent. See
Maria Hsia Chang & Robert P. Baker, Victor’s Justice & Japan’s Amnesia: The Tokyo
War Crimes Trial Reconsidered, in THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 33,
37-38 (Peter Li ed., 2003) (describing the results of the Tokyo Tribunal).
24 The Nuremberg (London) Charter defines “crimes against peace” as
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”
London Charter, supra note 4, art. 6(a). See also Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) art. 5(a), Aug. 8, 1945 (adding that war
could be declared or undeclared); Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 15, art.
II, ¶ 1(a) (covering “initiation of invasions” but not limiting the forms of
responsibility to planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of hostilities).
25 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE
INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY
TRIBUNAL
427
(1948),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2012).
26 “America aimed mostly at prosecuting the Nazis for the crime of
aggressive war.” GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 174 (2000). “Justice Jackson was intent on penalizing the
Germans for their war of aggression, and suggested that the United States might
refuse to participate in the trial unless the crime of aggressive war was included
within the Nuremberg Charter.” Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years
Later, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1991), (citing Minutes of Conference Session (July
25, 1945), reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 384 (1945)).
27 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
28 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 lists the U.N.’s purposes and principles as follows:
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defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization.29 After
Nuremberg, prosecuting the crime of aggression admittedly fell
into disuse;30 multilateral Security Council action became largely
impossible due to the Cold War, and despite the occurrences of
numerous mass atrocities,31 no tribunals of the Nuremberg variety
were created during this time-period. The most one sees is the
U.N. General Assembly, in 1974, adopting a resolution defining
aggression for the purposes of providing guidance to the Security
Council.32 However, the resolution had no binding effect as such.33
An extremely significant development, however, occurred in
June–July 1998, when the Rome Statute was finalized. States
included aggression as one of the crimes over which the ICC would
have jurisdiction.34 They essentially left a placeholder, however,
that the crime would first need to be defined and conditions for the

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace . . . .
(emphasis added).
29 See U.N. Charter ch. VII, arts. 42, 51. A third potential use of force that
might be implicitly permissible under the Charter would be humanitarian
intervention. Recent formulations of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine,
however, suggest that forceful humanitarian intervention still needs to receive
Security Council authorization. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res.
60/1, at 30 [¶¶ 138-39], U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
30 See Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L.
REV. 635, 635 (2007) (“Since Nuremberg [and Tokyo], no government officials
have actually been taken to court and charged with aggressive war.”).
31 Such mass atrocities would include, but not be limited to, those
perpetrated under Idi Amin in Uganda, and under the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia.
32 See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
33 All or part of a General Assembly resolution may come to have binding
effect if it morphs into customary international law.
34 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 1 (“The jurisdiction of the Court
shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute
with respect to the following crimes: (a) [t]he crime of genocide; (b) [c]rimes
against humanity; (c) [w]ar crimes; [and] (d) [t]he crime of aggression.”).
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exercise of jurisdiction agreed upon.35 (Many perhaps assumed
that no such agreement would ever be reached.) After conclusion
of the Rome Statute, such drafting work commenced,36 taking more
than ten years—Glennon’s article implies there were only five years
of negotiations37—first during sessions of the Preparatory
Commission for the ICC held from 1999–2002,38 then through
meetings of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (“SWGCA”) from 2003–2009, and, finally, during ICC
Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) meetings in 2009–2010.39
Final agreement40 to amend the Rome Statute to add the
definition and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction was
reached by consensus vote (that is, any single State Party could
have blocked it) at the first ICC Review Conference,41 negotiations
that the U.S. delegation attended and in which it participated.42
35 Article 5, ¶ 2 of the Rome Statute stated: “The Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this
crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.” Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 2.
36 Certain drafting work also occurred before and in Rome, with a number of
state proposals and a working group just prior to the Rome Conference. E-mail
from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Director of the Relations with Intergovernmental
Organizations, Union Internationale des Avocats, to author (May 24, 2011, 9:50
PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel].
37 Glennon, supra note 1, at 81.
38 See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm. The Preparatory Commission was created by
Resolution F of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, done at
Rome on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10.
39 Once the Special Working Group’s mandate ended, discussion on the
crime continued at the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties (held in
November 2009 in The Hague) and at the Resumed Eighth Session (held in March
2010 at the U.N.).
40 It is not the focus of this Article to trace the work accomplished during
these many years of negotiations, which has been extensively chronicled
elsewhere.
See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17; Trahan, Kampala
Negotiations, supra note 16.
41 New Def., supra note 4.
42 The U.S. negotiation team was headed by U.S. State Department Legal
Advisor Harold H. Koh, U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp, Deputy,
Office of War Crimes Issues, Diane F. Orentlicher, and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Detainee Policy William K. Lietzau. The United States, under the
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The U.S. delegation also attended the eighth ASP meeting in
November 2009 and its resumed session in March 2010,
participating in the aggression discussions during the latter
meeting. The United States, however, had declined (under the
prior administration) to participate in the years of negotiations in
the SWGCA, thereby missing the opportunity to play a role in
shaping the definition.
1.2. Overview of the Agreement Reached at the Review Conference
The definition of the crime of aggression consists of two parts,
namely, a definition of an “act of state” of aggression (the act the
state commits), and the definition of the “crime of aggression” (the
act the individual commits). These provisions, located in a new
Article 8 bis to the Rome Statute, will be discussed in detail below,
while examining Glennon’s critiques of the definition.
As to conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, as noted above,
States Parties agreed to two different procedures by which ICC
aggression cases may commence. With the first route, embodied in
a new Article 15 ter, the Security Council is given an initial six
months to act and refer a situation of suspected aggression to the
ICC.43 This method is similar to the one currently available as to
the ICC’s other crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity), which also may be referred to the ICC by the Security
Council,44 as occurred when the Security Council referred the
situations in Darfur45 and Libya.46 The second route, embodied in
George W. Bush administration, chose not to attend meetings of the Special
Working Group, but began participating, under the Obama Administration, at the
Eighth Assembly of States Parties meeting in November 2009. This late entry into
negotiations certainly minimized, almost entirely, the United States’ ability to
shape the definition’s text, although the United States participated extensively in
negotiations as to jurisdiction, and also proposed various “Understandings” to
accompany the definition, some of which were adopted. For discussion of the
Understandings proposed by the United States and those adopted, see Trahan,
Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16, at 73-78. For an interesting discussion of the
legal effect of the Understandings, see generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Uncertain
Legal Status of the Aggression Understandings, 10 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 229 (2012)
43 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter. As noted above, the referral might be of
a “situation” generally or the Security Council might be more specific and find
that an act of aggression had occurred.
44 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
45 See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
46 See S. C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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a new Article 15 bis to the Rome Statute, provides that if a State
Party has referred the case or the ICC Prosecutor has initiated it
proprio motu, and the Security Council has not made a
determination within six months after notification, the ICC PreTrial Division may authorize the commencement of the
investigation.47 This second method is similar to the method
currently available vis-à-vis other ICC crimes, which also may be
triggered by State Party referral or Prosecutor initiation, although
for other crimes there is no waiting period and no Pre-Trial
Division involvement.48 Details as to the jurisdictional regime
agreed upon are discussed more fully below.49
Finally, as noted above, ICC jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression will only commence in the future, because States Parties
agreed upon a delay mechanism at the Review Conference. First
there must be: (a) ratification or acceptance by thirty States Parties
of the aggression amendment; (b) the passage of one year after the
thirtieth ratification; and (c) a vote by two-thirds of States Parties
or consensus after January 1, 2017.50 Thus, aggression jurisdiction,
even when these requirements are met, will not commence until
January 2, 2017, at the earliest.

47 New Def, supra note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 8 (“Where no such [Security Council]
determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the
Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression,
provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure
contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in
accordance with article 16.”).
48 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(a) (referral by a State Party) & 13(c)
(Prosecutor initiation of an investigation). A State Party referral would not
require authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber while a referral by the Prosecutor
would. Compare id., art. 14 (referral of a situation by a State Party), with id., art. 15
(as to Prosecutor initiated investigations, the Prosecutor “shall submit to the PreTrial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation”).
49 See infra Section 2.3.
50 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 2–3 & art. 15 ter, ¶¶ 2–3 (providing
such procedures for both State Parties and Security Council referrals,
respectively).
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A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL GLENNON: THE DEFINITION DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE “BLANK” PROSE

Glennon’s concerns about the crime of aggression can be
grouped into three broad categories: (1) concerns with the
definition in light of issues raised by prosecutions of “crimes
against peace” before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well
as additional concerns as to vagueness;51 (2) concerns with the
definition’s scope when measured against past military action by
the United States and other states;52 and (3) concerns about the
relationship of the ICC and the Security Council with respect to
aggression adjudications.53 This Article will address each concern
in turn. It should be noted that Glennon’s article was written when
the definition was merely a proposed definition; however, the text
of the definition Glennon discussed is identical to the definition
adopted at the Review Conference. Agreement on the conditions
for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and
the introduction of the delay mechanism were only reached at the
Review Conference, after Glennon’s article was published.
2.1. Any Infirmities of the Nuremberg Prosecutions are Absent from
the Current Crime of Aggression Definition
Glennon’s article commences with an examination of various
criticisms leveled against the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal
prosecutions of “crimes against peace,” including (a) vagueness,
(b) retroactivity, and (c) the one-sided nature of the prosecutions
solely against the leaders of Axis countries. These are not new
arguments. The link that Glennon fails to establish, however, is
how any infirmities with the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions
would carry over to the present ICC definition.
The London Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal
defined “crimes against peace” as: “planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in

51
52
53

See Glennon, supra note 1, at 74–77, 96–102.
See id. at 90–96.
See id. at 102–09.
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a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing.”54
This definition is quite incomplete and also circular. It
basically states that “crimes against peace” are a “war of
aggression,” but does not define what constitutes a “war of
aggression.”55 Perhaps, in the context of World War II, this seemed
unnecessary and obvious.56
In light of the many possible forms that trans-border uses of
armed force by states may take, the current ICC definition, by
contrast, is far more detailed, and not in the least bit circular. It
states:
Article 8 bis
Crime of aggression
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression”
means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution,
by a person in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State,
of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression”
means the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty,
territorial
integrity
or
political
independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any
of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war,
shall, in accordance with United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
qualify as an act of aggression:
London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6(a) (emphasis added).
Roger Clark writes: “One wonder[s] why some nagging person at the
London Conference did not ask what a war was.” See Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg
and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 527, 535 (2007)
(discussing the drafting history of the London Charter).
56 Id. at 535–36. As Roger Clark points out, it was not, however, so obvious
how to treat an “invasion” that did not require shooting, such as the annexations
of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Tribunal ultimately characterized these
events as “acts of aggression,” as opposed to the invasion of Poland and other
countries, which were found to constitute aggressive war. Id.
54
55
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a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State
of the territory of another State, or any military
occupation, however temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the
use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof;
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against
the territory of another State or the use of any
weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another
State;
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are
within the territory of another State with the
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any
extension of their presence in such territory beyond
the termination of the agreement;
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which
it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above,
or its substantial involvement therein.57
Therefore, none of the criticisms of the Nuremberg definition
necessarily applies to the current definition. First, criticism that the
Nuremberg definition was too vague hardly demonstrates

57

New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis.
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anything about the current, far more detailed, definition.58 It is
worth noting that the definition is also a great deal more extensive
than the definition of the crime of genocide—an extremely serious
crime that has been successfully adjudicated many times before
international tribunals.59
Second, in terms of retroactivity, the relevant timing should be
considered. “Crimes against peace” as defined in the London
Charter creating the Nuremberg Tribunal was defined after the
crimes at issue were committed.60 Just the opposite will be true for

58 Specific additional vagueness arguments of Glennon are addressed below.
See infra Section 2.2.
59 The definition of the crime of “genocide” is “any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such” followed by a list of underlying crimes. See, e.g., Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 6. For discussion of the case law on genocide, see
JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A
TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 144–92 (2006) [hereinafter TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST]
(describing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s case
law on genocide); JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 15–82 (2010) [hereinafter TRAHAN, ICTR DIGEST] (discussing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s case law on genocide).
60 There was precedent, however, even for the Nuremberg prosecutions. The
1899 Hague Convention and 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes committed states to use mediation before an appeal to arms. See Trial of
the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),
Judgment, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 146, 149 (Mary
Ellen O’Connell ed., 2004) (noting precedents). The 1923 draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance sponsored by the League of Nations declared “that aggressive war is
an international crime.” It was submitted to twenty-nine states, about half of
whom were in favor of adopting it. Others had concerns with the definition,
rather than any doubt as to the criminality of aggression. Id. at 152. The Preamble
to the League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes declared that “a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international
crime.” Id. at 152–53 (noting that the Protocol was signed but not ratified). At the
meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 24, 1927, all the
delegations then present (including Germany, Italy, and Japan) unanimously
adopted a declaration concerning wars of aggression. The preamble stated: ”[A]
war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes,
and is in consequences an international crime.” Id. at 153. Finally, the KelloggBriand Pact was signed, inter alia, by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the Czechoslovak Republic outlawing
“recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” See KelloggBriand Pact, supra note 12, art. 1.
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the ICC. The ICC may not apply jurisdiction retroactively.61 Thus,
the ICC may not prosecute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity prior to entry into force of the Rome Statute (July 1, 2002,
and later for later-ratifying countries).62 When the ICC does
adjudicate these crimes, it uses the definitions agreed on in 1998.
Similarly, the ICC will not prosecute the crime of aggression until
after aggression jurisdiction is fully activated (in 2017 at the
earliest),63 and when it does, it will use the definition adopted in
the summer of 2010 at the Review Conference. Thus, none of the
retroactivity problems associated with the Nuremberg
prosecutions are applicable vis-à-vis the ICC.64 (Glennon appears
to concede as much, suggesting that the reason the current
definition would violate the ban on retroactive application of the

61 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (“non-retroactivity ratione
personae” meaning that “[n]o person shall be criminally responsible under this
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute”).
62 Sixty ratifications were necessary for the Rome Statute to enter into force.
See id. art. 126, ¶ 1. That number was reached when the final instruments of
ratification were simultaneously deposited on March 11, 2002, bringing total
ratifications to 66. For later ratifying states, the date of entry into force is
calculated by adding sixty days to the date of that state’s ratification, and then
proceeding to the first day of the next month. See id. art. 126, ¶ 2. The ICC may
exercise jurisdiction with regard to situations in a state’s territory or involving a
state’s citizens before ratification if there has been a Security Council referral or if
the requirements of Articles 12, ¶¶ 2 or 3 are otherwise met. See id. arts. 12–13.
63 For discussion of the procedural requirements necessary for jurisdiction to
commence, see supra note 10.
64 See Hurd, supra note 1, at 4 (critiquing Glennon’s retroactivity arguments
as “irrelevant . . . since no one is suggesting that the ICC should claim retroactive
jurisdiction over aggression”). One reason that Glennon’s position appears so
alarmist is that he appears to be writing from a very different viewpoint than
most international lawyers. Glennon does not appear to believe that the crime of
aggression is a crime under customary international law (a minority view) and
seems to even question whether the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in
the U.N. Charter is a rule of international law (a very uncommon view). See
Glennon, supra note 1, at 101 n.165 and text accompanying. These views mean
that his criticisms are not just ones of drafting, but that his notice problems are
really about what he views as the creation of a new rule of international law,
contrary to how many international lawyers would view the issue. See E-mail
from Pål Wrange, Associate Professor of Public International Law, Stockholm
University, to author (June 15, 2011, 4:41 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from Pål Wrange].
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laws is due to vagueness,65 thereby collapsing his “retroactivity”
argument into his “vagueness” argument).
Third, in terms of the criticism that Nuremberg imposed only
“victor’s justice” and thus was a politicized use of justice solely
against Axis leaders,66 this situation is not present vis-à-vis the
ICC, which may prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity in three situations: (a) when the crimes have
been committed in the territory of a State Party;67 (b) when they
have been committed by the national of a State Party;68 or (c) when
referred by the U.N. Security Council under its Chapter VII
powers.69 The same will be true for the crime of aggression, with
certain added exceptions.70 Thus, it is whether a country has
ratified the Rome Statute that is the most significant issue in
determining whether jurisdiction exists. (As to the crime of
aggression, whether a State Party files an “opt out” declaration will
also be significant.71) Obviously, not all states have ratified the
Rome Statute (particularly some very powerful ones),72 so ICC
jurisdiction is not universal, but this is a matter of choice by states,

65 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 88 (arguing that the definition does not
provide sufficient notice to defendants as to what is proscribed).
66 See id. at 75–76 (noting Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concern “I
wonder how some of those who preside at the trials would justify some of the acts
of their own governments if they were placed in the status of the accused,” and
Supreme Court Justice (and Nuremberg Prosecutor) Robert Jackson’s reflection
upon the “hypocrisy of the charge in light of the actions of the Soviet Union”).
Indeed, the London Charter only gave the tribunal “the power to try and punish
persons . . . [who committed crimes while] acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries.” London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6.
67 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 2(a).
68 Id. art. 12, ¶ 2(b).
69 Id. art. 13(b).
70 As to State Party referrals or cases triggered by proprio motu initiation: (i)
nationals of non-States Parties will not be subject to prosecution for aggression
even if it occurs in the territory of a State Party; (ii) nationals of States Parties
cannot be prosecuted for aggression if it occurs in the territory of a non-State
Party; and (iii) States Parties will be able to file “opt out” declarations, avoiding
ICC aggression jurisdiction. New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 4–5.
71 As noted supra note 70, States Parties will be able to file “opt out”
declarations, avoiding State Party referral and Prosecutor initiation of aggression
cases. Id.
72 Neither Russia, China, nor the United States has ratified the Rome Statute.
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and not a politicized use of the tribunal.73 Thus, none of these
criticisms of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s prosecutions can
necessarily be leveled in the current situation.
2.2. The Definition of the Crime Does Not Suffer From Overbreadth or
Vagueness
Glennon then presents additional arguments why the text of
the current definition purportedly suffers from “overbreadth and
vagueness,” concluding that it fails to “provide sufficient notice to
potential defendants as to what conduct is permitted and what is
proscribed.”74 In making these arguments, Glennon examines the
definition of an “act of aggression,” the definition of the “crime of
aggression,” and the breadth of those definitions when measured
against past military actions of the United States and other states.
While Glennon raises some interesting questions, many of his
arguments rest on illogical application of the definition’s language,
a failure to read the first and second paragraphs of the definition in
conjunction, and ignorance of the actual, very extensive,
negotiating history.75
73 Whether or not a State Party files an opt out declaration will also be a
matter of choice. Undoubtedly, some “politicization” enters the picture because
the Security Council may refer situations to the ICC and may also “defer” them.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13(b), 16. While involvement of the Security
Council, a political body, in the work of a judicial institution may not appear ideal
(although the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation (see supra note 45)
was commendable, and the Libya referral (see supra note 46) may prove so as
well), the role of the Security Council represented a compromise agreed upon at
Rome that would both accommodate those concerned with the peace/justice
tension (through Article 16), and those anxious about the ICC’s limitations by
allowing the Security Council to use its Chapter VII authority to broaden the
range of cases the ICC could take (through Article 13). E-mail from John
Washburn, Convener, American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for
the International Criminal Court (AMICC), to author (March 3, 2012) (on file with
author).
74 Glennon, supra note 1, at 88. This author does not challenge Glennon’s
arguments that the principle of legality and prohibition on retroactive lawmaking,
id. at 82–86, are applicable standards.
75 It is a bit amazing that, despite more than 10 years of negotiations, which
generated ample travaux préparatoires, Glennon’s article contains not a single cite to
these negotiations. It is worth noting, however, that the most comprehensive
compilation of that material may not have been published when Glennon drafted
his article. See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17. Glennon’s article also
completely ignores the existence of elements of the crime of aggression, which
were also in existence prior to the Review Conference.
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2.2.1. Glennon’s Distortion of What Constitutes an “Act of
Aggression”
As noted above, the current ICC definition consists of the
definition of an “act of aggression” (in paragraph 2), which is the
act the state would commit, and the “crime of aggression” (in
paragraph 1), which describes the individual’s involvement.
Glennon first attacks the breadth of the definition of “act of
aggression.”
His first argument is that “act of aggression”—defined as “the
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”76—is
too broadly worded because it would cover action undertaken by a
state in self-defense or pursuant to Security Council approval.77
That is a nonsensical reading of the text. Actions taken by a state
in a legitimate exercise of individual or collective self-defense or
pursuant to U.N. Security Council authorization are clearly
permissible under Article 51 and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,78
and thus are uses of armed force consistent with the U.N. Charter,
and clearly not acts of aggression.79
Glennon argues, for example, that coalition use of force against
Iraq in 1990 would fall within the definition of “act of
aggression.”80 Because coalition use of force against Iraq in 1990
was both undertaken in collective self-defense of Kuwait, and thus
permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and pursuant to

New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2.
Glennon, supra note 1, at 88.
78 See U.N. Charter chapter VII, arts. 39–42, 51.
79 In such instances, there is no aggression, so one does not need to reach the
issue that there is also no “manifest” Charter violation. See Roger S. Clark,
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the
First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May–11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J.
INT’L L. 689, 698 n.29 (2010) (suggesting that one might also rely on Article 31 of
the Rome Statute, entitled “Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility”). Selfdefense could presumably include anticipatory self-defense, but, to the extent
allowed, it would require a threat of an imminent attack. See JANE STROMSETH ET
AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS 44 n.83 (2006) (citing authorities).
80 Glennon, supra note 1, at 88-89.
76
77
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Security Council authorization,81 and therefore permissible under
Chapter VII, it clearly was not an act of aggression.82 At heart,
Glennon’s concern may be—although he does not state it so
plainly—that the “or” in the definition of “act of aggression”
should be read as an “and” (that is, there must both be “armed
force . . . against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State” and it must be “inconsistent with
the Charter”).83 If that is his point, this is something the ICC judges
will be perfectly capable of ruling on as a matter of statutory
construction. The ad hoc tribunal judges had to resolve just such a
question of statutory construction as to command responsibility,
where a certain “or” in the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes is in some
situations read as an “and.”84 Another construction is also
possible: that action taken by a state in individual or collective
self-defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization is not
armed force “against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or

81 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing “all
necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area).
82 Glennon’s wording is strange: he later concedes “[a]cts of aggression that
are carried out in self-defense and those authorized by the Security Council are
permissible.” Glennon, supra note 1, at 89. The point is correct; the language is
not. Action carried out in self-defense or pursuant to Security Council
authorization is not an “act of aggression.” It constitutes the exercise of selfdefense, or an authorized enforcement action.
83 Glennon is also inconsistent here. At one point he writes that the Charter
“implies” that use of force is allowed if not directed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of a state, Glennon, supra note 1, at 96, but elsewhere
appears to also require a contravention of the purposes of the UN.
84 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes on command responsibility state:

The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, ¶ 3, S.C. Res. 955,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 6, 1994) (emphasis added). The final clause
clearly has an “or” in it. Case law, however, states that these are not options. A
superior does not have a choice whether to prevent or whether to punish; if
prevention fails, then there must be punishment. So if prevention succeeded, one
would not reach the issue of punishment (and “or” might be considered
appropriate), but if prevention failed, there is an obligation to punish (in that
instance, the “or” is being read as an “and”). See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note
59, at 484 n.51; TRAHAN, ICTR DIGEST, supra note 59, at 233 n.55.
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political independence of another State” because it is self-defense
or an enforcement action.
Furthermore, the language Glennon takes issue with is
practically a quote of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter85—language
clearly not read to preclude action taken in self-defense or pursuant
to Security Council authorization. In fact, States Parties at the
Review Conference were essentially precluded from changing this
construction, because under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, any
treaty provision contrary to the Charter would be void.86 Thus,
Glennon’s examples that the bombing of Baghdad in 1991 would
be an act of aggression, as would the overthrow of the Taliban
government in Afghanistan in 2001,87 completely miss the mark.88
Both were recognized as actions taken in self-defense and
authorized by the Security Council. (Gulf War I was recognized as
collective self-defense of Kuwait, and the Security Council’s
authorization covered not only use of force to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait, but was also more broadly worded, thus permitting
targeting within Iraq.89 Coalition forces in Afghanistan were
responding to the 9/11 attack, which the Security Council
indirectly recognized as triggering a right by the United States to
self-defense.90)

See supra note 13 (quoting Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter).
See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.”).
87 Glennon, supra note 1, at 89.
88 Indeed, Glennon essentially later admits as much when he states that “acts
of aggression authorized by the Security Council or carried out for self defense
under Article 51 are not prosecutable.” Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.
89 S.C. Res. 678, supra note 81 (authorizing “all necessary means” to uphold
and implement Resolution 660 and “to restore international peace and security in
the area”).
90 The Security Council “in its first resolutions on the events of September 11,
‘recogniz[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in
accordance with the Charter.’” Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After
September 11, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 905, 909 (2002) (quoting S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)). See S.C. Res. 1368, supra; S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (recognizing and reaffirming, respectively, ”the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”); see also J.M. Spectar,
Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law & The Use of Force in the
Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2006) (observing that the U.N. Security
Council “resolution recognized and affirmed the right of self-defense, thereby
85
86

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE)

930

4/18/2012 2:58 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:4

2.2.2. Glennon’s Inaccurate Applications of the Definition to Various
Past U.S. Military Actions
The definition of the act of aggression continues with a second
sentence: “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of
war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of
aggression . . . .”91 It then lists various uses of force that would
constitute acts of aggression, deriving the list from U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 3314.92 Glennon suggests that because
certain U.S. past actions would fall within that list, there must be
an overbreadth problem with the definition. Not only is that not
necessarily the case,93 but it erroneously suggests that past U.S.
further cloaking (at least indirectly) the U.S. response with international
legitimacy”). The Security Council might have questioned whether self-defense
permitted action against both Al Qaeda (perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks) and the
Taliban (who harbored them), and whether the response was proportionate to the
scope of the armed attack. See, e.g., Ratner, supra (taking a critical look at the
international law foundation for proceeding against the Taliban); see also Antonio
Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International
Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001). The Security Council, however, appears not to
have made such a distinction. See Spectar, supra, at 64 (“While the Council did not
specifically authorize the use of force against the Taliban, it was not opposed to it
either.”). The Security Council additionally issued no resolution condemning the
scope of the intervention in Afghanistan, which might constitute implied
acceptance. The Security Council also issued resolutions endorsing the Bonn
transitional process in Afghanistan, see S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383
(Dec. 6, 2001), and authorizing an international force presence (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, see S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), both of
which actions suggest an after-the-fact acceptance of the Taliban’s ouster.
91 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2.
92 “[T]he General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression [was] conceived
as a guide to the Security Council in carrying out its functions under the Charter .
. . .” Ratner, supra note 90, at 907.
93 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90–94. Glennon’s argument has been rebutted by
another scholar this way:
The key unanswered question is whether Glennon’s goal here is to say
something about American foreign policy or about the construction of
the [definition of the crime of aggression]. If we assume from the start
that US foreign policy by definition cannot possibly be aggressive, then
these cases would indeed suggest that the rule is badly written. Without
such an assumption, however, is Glennon trying to point out that US
leaders have at times used force aggressively [and] in violation of Article
2(4) of the UN Charter? [Or is he] showing that Americans are at times
the perpetrators of aggression but that they do not deserve to be
prosecuted[?].
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actions will be judged by the current definition (which they will
not, given the ban on retroactivity),94 fails to reflect that the United
States is exempt from aggression jurisdiction as a non-State Party
to the Rome Statute95 (an exemption admittedly negotiated after
Glennon wrote his article), and also ignores the threshold language
in paragraph 1 (requiring a “manifest” violation of the U.N.
Charter), that would also need to apply to any of the acts listed in
paragraph 2 for there to be a crime of aggression.96
Glennon’s logic appears at its weakest when he implies that
because U.S. commencement of Gulf War II might fall within the
first sub-paragraph 2(a) “invasion or attack,” there is something
wrong with considering an “invasion or attack” as an act of
aggression.97 Indeed, an “invasion or attack” that is neither a
legitimate exercise of self-defense, authorized by the U.N. Security
Council, nor humanitarian in nature would seem to be a classic
example of what should be covered as an act of aggression. Because
the legal reasoning supporting the argument that Gulf War II was
authorized under prior Security Council resolutions rests upon an
attenuated reading of open-ended resolutions pertaining to Gulf
War I and the subsequent disarmament and inspections regime,
and clearly received no express Security Council authorization,98
many states, commentators, and scholars do view the
commencement of Gulf War II as the unauthorized use of force.99

Hurd, supra note 1, at 5.
94 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24.
95 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5. As noted above, Security Council
referral of aggression committed by a U.S. national or on U.S. territory, while
theoretically possible, would be subject to U.S. exercise of its veto power. See
supra, note 9.
96 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶¶ 1, 2.
97 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90–92.
98 One can possibly combine Security Council Resolutions 678, 686, 687, and
1441 to argue that open-ended language found in the authorization of Gulf War I
and subsequent resolutions pertaining to its resolution and subsequent imposition
of a weapons inspection regime provided authorization for Gulf War II.
However, the United States clearly sought an additional resolution from the
Security Council expressly authorizing Gulf War II and did not obtain it, yet
nonetheless commenced Gulf War II.
99 See, e.g., Spectar, supra note 90 (critiquing U.S. use of force in Gulf War II).
Spectar states:
The Bush Administration showed great disdain for the Charter
prohibition against the use of force in international relations by: (a)
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The argument that Gulf War II constituted humanitarian
intervention is no more plausible. Mass atrocities were committed
by the Iraqi Government under Saddam Hussein’s leadership. For
example, in Iraq in 1988, atrocities were committed against the
Iraqi Kurds during the notorious “Anfal campaign” and in 1991
against the Shi’a. But these crimes were too temporally remote to
justify intervention in 2003. Any kind of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense argument (on the theory that the U.S.
believed the Iraqi regime to possess weapons of mass destruction)
is also generally considered weak, since most scholars would
consider anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense (if permissible at
all) to require some form of “imminent” risk of attack,100 and
arguments that Iraq had an active weapons of mass destruction
(“WMD”) program appear to have been based on “outdated,
hyped, unrepresentative, expedient, and poorly analyzed”
information from “questionable sources.”101 Glennon’s argument
that the United Kingdom also supported Gulf War II102 fails to
bolster his position significantly, given there is an inquiry pending
in the U.K. as to why the U.K. participated in Gulf War II.103
electing to launch a preemptive invasion and occupation of Iraq in the
absence of substantial legal justification; [and] (b) proceeding with the
military option in the absence of UN approval and without the support
of the international community . . . .
Id. at 49. See also id. at 84 (“Many international lawyers maintain the
Administration’s hyper-technical reading of prior resolutions to justify the [GW
II] invasion is ‘weak and transparent’ and unpersuasive.”); Tom J. Farer, The
Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 626
(2003) (“In 2003 . . . many observers detected an attitude on the part of the [Bush]
administration of open defiance of the Charter system. . . .”); Hamada Zahawi,
Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CAL. L
REV. 2295, 2315–16 (2007) (“Since the U.N. never officially authorized the invasion
of Iraq, the international community saw the invasion as an illegal foreign
military intervention.”).
100 See Spectar, supra note 90, at 84 (“[T]he Article 51 exception for use of force
in cases of self-defense does not apply . . . in the absence of an imminent and
exist[ing] threat.”). Under the oft-quoted 1837 Caroline test, self-defense must be
demonstrated by its “necessity . . . [as] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Ratner, supra note 90, at 907
(citing Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)).
101 Spectar, supra note 90, at 87.
102 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90.
103 There is currently an Iraq Inquiry in the U.K., mandated to examine the
U.K.’s involvement in Gulf War II, including the way decisions were made and
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Glennon’s arguments are also unduly alarmist. Not only are
past U.S. actions not covered by the current definition because of
the ban on retroactivity,104 but future U.S. actions will most likely
not be covered either. Admittedly after Glennon’s article was
published, States Parties at the Review Conference agreed on an
exemption from aggression jurisdiction for non-States Parties: “In
respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall
not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed
by that State’s nationals or on its territory.”105
This exemption would apply to investigations triggered by
State Party referral or proprio motu action of the Prosecutor.106
While Security Council referrals as to aggression committed in the
territory of, or by a national of, a non-State Party would still be
possible, given that the United States holds a permanent seat on
the U.N. Security Council and has veto power over substantive
votes, the United States could clearly veto any such attempted
referral. If the United States were someday to ratify the ICC
Statute, it would then have the option of “opting out” of
aggression jurisdiction (something also agreed upon after
Glennon’s article was published).107 Thus, regardless of how one
feels about whether or not U.S. leaders should be completely exempt
from ICC aggression jurisdiction, it is hard to imagine how they
could be subject to it, even when jurisdiction commences in 2017 or
actions taken, to establish as accurately and reliably as possible what happened,
and to identify lessons that can be learned. The U.K. Prime Minister appointed
the members of the inquiry committee. See About the Inquiry, IRAQ INQUIRY,
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (detailing the United Kingdom’s
inquiry process into the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict).
104 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (“No person shall be criminally
responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the
Statute.”).
105 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
106 Compare id. (dealing with state referrals and proprio motu action), with New
Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter (relating to Security Council referrals).
107 At the Review Conference, agreement was reached that “[t]he Court may,
in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression,
arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party
has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration
with the Registrar.” New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). As
noted above, an unlikely exception would exist if the United States permitted an
aggression referral by the Security Council, choosing not to exercise its veto
power. See supra note 9 (discussing potential scenarios in which U.S. officials
could be brought before the Court).
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thereafter.108 To the extent that the existence of the definition
might cause increased U.S. circumspection about future uses of
military force, and perhaps contribute moral weight to ensuring
that future U.S. interventions are either authorized by the Security
Council, legitimate exercises of individual or collective selfdefense, or humanitarian in nature, some might consider that a
good outcome.109
108 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the process required
for activation of the crime of aggression).
109 Increased circumspection will also be warranted because the United
States’ closest European allies are ICC State Parties, so the existence of the crime
of aggression may impact their calculations more directly (particularly after
activation), making it harder for the United States to obtain coalition partners for
any interventions of questionable legality. (Of course, those coalition partners
will still have the option of exercising opt out declarations.)
Additionally, circumspection is also warranted because now that a definition
has been adopted, States Parties may incorporate it into their national laws
(theoretically, even before 2017). Non-States Parties could do so as well. Indeed,
some states already criminalize the crime of aggression in their domestic criminal
codes.
See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, National Legislation on Individual
Responsibility for Conduct Amounting to Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 547, 551 n.29
(Roberto Bellelli ed., 2010) (citing crime of aggression laws in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (criminal codes of the Federation,
Brcko District and Republika Srpska), Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).
Domestic law incorporation of the crime of aggression has the potential to
create aggression jurisdiction over U.S. nationals before domestic courts either
through territorial exercise of jurisdiction or perhaps even through universal
jurisdiction. This Author has elsewhere suggested that further consideration
should be given to whether the ICC should have a relationship of “primacy” to
such national court prosecutions (so that such national court prosecutions might
be adjudicated before the ICC), rather than the current relationship of
“complementarity” established under the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra
note 2, art. 17 (establishing a regime whereby national court jurisdiction can
render ICC cases inadmissible); see Trahan Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16, at
89 n.158 (expressing concern about the complementarity regime and the crime of
aggression); see also Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the
International Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression?, CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming
2012); Beth Van Schaack, Par In Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the
Crime of Aggression, 10(1) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. (2012). Understanding 5 states: “It is
understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or
obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression
committed by another State.”
Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
Understandings Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex III,
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Glennon also nowhere considers that many of his examples are
from the Cold War era, a time when collective Security Council
action was generally blocked by Soviet-U.S. rivalry, and “each
superpower in varying ways and to varying degrees slipped the
Charter’s normative harness.”110 During the Cold War “the two
superpowers rather openly defied the Charter where it conflicted
with their will to maintain ideological hegemony in their spheres
of influence.”111 By contrast, we are now in a “new era of
international cooperation in the post Cold War world,”112 which
“widen[s] the potential occasions for the [Security Council to agree
on] the legitimate use of force.”113 Thus, action that the United
States might have taken unilaterally in the past may now be much
more readily approved by the Security Council. For example, the
agreement the Security Council reached in authorizing
intervention in Libya114 would probably have been unimaginable
during the Cold War era. Thus, looking at past practice from the
Cold War era is not necessarily indicative of whether states might
view aggressive, unilateral use of force as necessary or desirable in
the post-Cold War period.
Finally, in his discussion of the various subparts of paragraph
2, Glennon ignores that for there to be a crime of aggression, there
are certain thresholds that need to be met under the language of
paragraph 1. He simply fails to read paragraph 2 of the definition
after paragraph 1—a violation of the basic rule of good faith in
treaty construction.115 Thus, it is not just any “invasion or attack”

RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def. Understandings], ¶ 5. That
Understanding does not necessarily impact a state’s decision to exercise domestic
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; it merely states that the amendment
shall not create such “right or obligation.” On the other hand, if a State Party
wants to avail itself of the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute,
it presumably would want to incorporate the crime into its domestic criminal
code. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17 (laying out complementarity).
110 Farer, supra note 99, at 623.
111 Id.
112 Spectar, supra note 90, at 50.
113 Farer, supra note 99, at 624.
114 See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
115 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, done May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
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or “bombardment,” etc., that is covered; paragraph 1 also requires
that any act of state of aggression must necessarily “by its
character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations”116 in order for there to be the crime
of aggression. In none of his discussion of the various subparagraphs of paragraph 2 does Glennon consider this threshold
requirement, or that the ICC (with only limited capacity to
investigate and try cases) is mandated only to consider the most
serious situations.117 An understanding (also agreed upon in
Kampala, and thus admittedly after Glennon published his article)
that “aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the
illegal use of force”118 further reinforces that the ICC will only
adjudicate the most serious situations.
The threshold requirement of a “manifest” Charter violation is
designed to ensure that the crime of aggression is not prosecuted in
any “borderline cases”119 or those “falling within a grey area.”120
To understand what is a “manifest” violation, the definition makes
clear that one must assess the “character, gravity and scale” of the
use of force.121 Thus, factually weaker cases, such as minimal
border incursions, would be excluded, because the act of state
would not meet the “gravity” or “scale” requirements.122 Legally

New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Affirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and . . . Determined . . . to establish an independent permanent
International Criminal Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole . . . .”).
118 New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6. But see Heller, supra note
42, at 2–3 (questioning whether an Understanding can add anything that is not
already in the text of the amendment).
119 February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17,
at 51, ¶ 13.
120 June 2008 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at
87, ¶ 68.
121 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1(emphasis added). The requirement
of examining all three criteria (and that no single criterion could suffice) is further
emphasized by Understanding 7 that “the three components of character, gravity,
and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination. No one
component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.”
New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 7.
122 Thus, for example, “the requirement that the character, gravity, and scale
of an act of aggression amount to a manifest violation of the Charter would ensure
that a minor border skirmish would not be a matter for the Court to take up.”
116
117
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debatable cases would be excluded, because the act of state would
not have the right “character” to constitute a manifest violation of
the Charter.123 Excluding legally debatable cases means that
humanitarian intervention is not covered by the crime of
aggression.124 Accordingly, Glennon’s argument that the 1999
NATO bombing operations against Yugoslavia amounted to
“bombardment” as an act of aggression125 is misleading.
Humanitarian intervention would not constitute a “manifest”
violation of the U.N. Charter, but a “grey area” case that would be
excluded.126 Glennon’s suggestion, that because U.S. arming of the
Contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s might be covered under
paragraph 2(g) there must be something wrong with paragraph
2(g),127 is similarly unpersuasive.128
Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 8. The
International Court of Justice appears to have taken such a look at the issue of
scale in the Nicaragua case when it stated that sending armed bands amounted to
an armed attack only if “because of its scale and effects” it would be more than a
“mere frontier incident,” or if it were “on a significant scale”. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶
195 (June 27) (emphasis added). See also Ratner, supra note 90, at 907 (noting the
International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua holdings).
123 See supra Section 2.2.2.
124 See Claus Kreß, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of
the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1129, 1140
(2009) (“[T]he international legality of a genuine humanitarian intervention, such
as the 1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, is also open to genuine debate, and is
thus excluded from the scope of [then] draft Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute.”); see
also ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 268 (2007) (“[T]here is controversy over whether there is also an
exception for humanitarian intervention.”). Additional provisions in the Rome
Statute that protect against bringing legally borderline cases include: (i) the
exclusion of criminal responsibility if conduct is permissible under applicable law;
(ii) the inclusion of principles and rules of international law; (iii) the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and (iv) the principle in dubio pro reo (a
defendant may not be convicted when doubts about guilt remain). Rome Statute,
supra note 2, arts. 31, ¶ 3; 21 & 66.
125 Glennon, supra note 1, at 92.
126 See Pål Wrange, Of Power and Justice, 4 GERMAN L.J. 935, 947 (2003) (“In
Kosovo, the humanitarian goal was evident and prevalent . . . .”).
127 Glennon, supra note 1, at 94 (“The International Court of Justice found that
the principle articulated in the paragraph 2(g) provision represented customary
international law and that the United States was in breach of the prohibition.”).
128 First, the International Court of Justice ruled against U.S. actions in that
case. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 238–245 (June 27). Second, even then, paragraph 2(g)
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Glennon’s point, that “the truth is that in most of those and
other instances, a person of common intelligence would necessarily
have to guess which side violated the Charter,”129 also fails.
Decisions on the use of force should not be made by persons of
“common intelligence,” but by the best and brightest with objective
advice from first-rate lawyers and eventually reviewed by
qualified jurists, if it comes to that.130 While there will be some
grey area cases, there will nevertheless be many cases that are
clear-cut to impartial lawyers and other observers, and both the
wording of the relevant provisions and the instinct for institutional
self-preservation will ensure that the ICC stays away from issues
that are genuinely controversial and unclear.131
2.2.3. Glennon’s Applications of the Definition to Military Actions
by Other States
Glennon then points to various uses of military force by other
states, again as if to suggest that coverage of such acts shows
infirmity of the definition.132 First, he cites the sheer number of
uses of force by states from 1945 to 1989, as if to suggest
overbreadth as to the current definition or a misconception as to
why aggressive uses of force should be a crime.133 In fact, that
aggressive use of force has often been resorted to could suggest
that the prohibition on aggressive use of force in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter—which is supposed to be treated as the highest level

would still need to be read in conjunction with the requirement of a “manifest”
violation. To the extent that “manifest” is read in light of the Understanding that
“aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force,”
not all sending of “armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” would
necessarily be covered. New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2(g); New Def.
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6.
129 Glennon, supra note 1, at 101 (emphasis added).
130 E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64.
131 See id.
As noted elsewhere, reasons for conservatism include the
“manifest” qualifier, the text of Understanding 6, as well as other provisions of the
Rome Statute. See New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6 (explaining that
determining whether an act of aggression has occurred “requires consideration of
all the circumstances of each particular case . . . .”).
132 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 94–95 (arguing that a multitude of states have
engaged in conduct that would satisfy the definition).
133 Id. at 94 (“By one count . . . from 1945 to 1989 force was employed 200
times, and by another count, 680 times.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of international law (a jus cogens or peremptory norm)134—has not
sufficiently succeeded in deterring it,135 and that additional
deterrence (ICC jurisdiction) is sorely needed. Glennon simply
fails to convince one why aggressive use of armed force that
constitutes a manifest Charter violation, often resulting in massive
loss of life, should not constitute a crime. Why should war crimes
be prosecuted before the ICC, but going to war be perfectly
acceptable as a matter of international criminal law? Such
arguments are arguably relics of an earlier era, when it was
acceptable for states to resolve their grievances through recourse to
arms.136 The fact that aggressive use of force has been committed in
the past is no reason why it should necessarily continue
indefinitely, undeterred, for future generations.
Glennon cites Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and North Vietnamese military
actions against South Vietnam from 1960 through 1975 to bolster
his position,137 but such uses of force could also bolster the contrary

134 See Cassese, supra note 90, at 1000 (“Article 2(4) of the UN Charter . . . has
by now become a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).”); see also
Ratner, supra note 90, at 914 (“[T]he Charter provisions on the use of force are
typically regarded as not merely hard [law] but jus cogens.”) (citing, inter alia,
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970
I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts art. 50, ¶ 1(a), in Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr.
23–June 1, 2001 & July 2–August 10, 2001, 43, 337, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility]); Spectar, supra note 90, at 47–48 (“At the heart of the post World
War II order, Article 2 paragraph 4 has been recognized as a peremptory norm jus
cogens by many international scholars.”); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 59 (2d ed. 2006)
(“[T]he law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the
character of jus cogens.”) (quoting the International Law Commission’s
commentary on the final draft of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties). See Kreß, supra note 124, at 1130-33 nn. 7–12 (collecting a long list of
sources).
135 The lack of deterrence was perhaps particularly apparent during the Cold
War when Security Council voting to condemn aggressive use of force was subject
to U.S. and Soviet veto.
136 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 134, at 877 (“Prior to the 1920s, states viewed
war as a lawful means to redress grievances and alter legal relations between
states.”).
137 Glennon, supra note 1, at 95–96.
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argument. Massive fatalities occurred during the Vietnam War,138
and an estimated 1.25 million Afghan fatalities (nine percent of the
population) resulted from the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan.139 Does Glennon really mean to defend these uses of
force? Arguments regarding past uses of force by both the
U.S.S.R./Russia and Vietnam are also hypothetical. Not only will
the crime of aggression not apply retroactively, but, like U.S.
leaders, Russian or Vietnamese leaders will not be covered by ICC
aggression jurisdiction because Russia and Vietnam are non-States
Parties to the Rome Statute, and at least Russia is in a position to
veto any Security Council aggression referral related to its
nationals or crimes committed on its territory. These limitations, if
anything, illustrate both the conservative nature of, and a potential
weakness in, the jurisdictional regime agreed upon at the Review
Conference.
Earlier humanitarian interventions in Uganda,
Cambodia, and East Pakistan140 invoked by Glennon similarly miss
the mark, because, as noted above, the definition will not apply
retroactively141 and humanitarian intervention will not be
covered.142
2.2.4. Glennon’s Additional Perceived Ambiguities as to the
Definition of “Act of Aggression”
Glennon next offers critiques of the particular wording of the
definition of “act of aggression,” which he finds vague.143 His
138 Fatality figures for the Vietnam War vary widely, but some median
estimates are: 224,000 South Vietnamese military; 666,000–1,000,000 North
Vietnamese military and Viet Cong; 300,000-1,500,000 South Vietnamese civilians;
65,000 North Vietnamese civilians and 58,000 Americans. Median estimates of
total casualties for the entire conflict range between 2,850,000-3,000,000. See
Matthew White, Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth
Century, NECROMETRICS.COM, http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Vietnam, (last
updated June 2011).
139 GREGORY FEIFER, THE GREAT GAMBLE: THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 4
(2009) (estimating 1.25 million Afghan deaths; also estimating between 15,000 and
75,000 Soviet deaths). See also White, supra note 138 (mean estimate of fatality
figures of 1.5 million for the Soviet phase and immediate aftermath).
140 Glennon, supra note 1, at 95.
141 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 124. Additionally, Pakistan is not a State Party to the Rome
Statute, so actions by its nationals or on its territory could not be the subject of
State Party referral or proprio motu action.
143 Glennon, supra note 1, at 96–98.
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critiques concern: (1) why only “armed force” is covered rather
than “force”; (2) why “sovereignty” is protected; (3) the
relationship between the definition and other provisions of U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3314 not expressly incorporated; and
(4) why “armed force” was covered but not a “war” of
aggression.144 This Article addresses each question in turn.
First, Glennon (correctly) notes that the definition covers
“armed force” and not “force.”145 He questions why this is,
suggesting, for instance, that it might improperly exclude cyberattacks, or the use of chemical or biological weapons.146 He also
questions why it covers armed force “by a state” and not by nonstate actors.147 These are interesting questions—but ones that were
debated by states that participated in the extensive negotiations on
the definition over the years. Because, as noted above in Section
1.1, the United States (under the Bush Administration) chose not to
attend these negotiations (which were open to non-States Parties—
Russia and China, for example, attended and participated),148 the
United States did not participate in shaping the definition.
Perhaps there would be a stronger definition had the United States
participated.
As to why only “armed” force is covered, admittedly the
definition is somewhat conservative. A decision was made to
utilize the list of acts of aggression covered in G.A. Resolution 3314
rather than open what some described as a “proverbial can of
worms” and try to define such acts anew.149 Today, an argument
might be made for including cyber-attacks, but the definition is
more conservative, and admittedly somewhat backward-looking in
utilizing a list of acts of aggression agreed on in 1974. Similarly,
the definition covers “state” acts of aggression, not acts of nonstate actors. This definition is also somewhat conservative, but it
does not mean that non-state actors may commit trans-border uses
of force without criminal consequences because such actions might
well constitute the crime of terrorism, war crimes, or crimes against
Id.
Id. at 96.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Observations as to past negotiations otherwise not specifically attributed
are based on the author’s recollection of meetings the author attended.
149 See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 9–10.
144
145
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humanity.150 As to the use of chemical or biological weapons
(which Glennon claims would be excluded),151 to the extent they
would be launched by a conventional weapons system, they would
constitute “armed force” and would be covered.152 Use of chemical
or biological weapons also constitutes a war crime.153
Second, the word “sovereignty” in the definition, which covers
armed force “against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State,” hardly seems controversial.
“Sovereignty” is another word used to describe the protection of
states’ territorial integrity and political independence.154
150 Thus, Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States would not fall within the
definition of “act of aggression” because it was not committed by a state.
However it most certainly constituted the crime of terrorism, various war crimes
(such as targeting civilians and civilian objects), and arguably also a crime against
humanity. See Cassese, supra note 90, at 994-95 (arguing that the 9/11 attack
constituted a crime against humanity). Also, given a sufficient connection
between a non-state actor and a state, it might be possible to impute acts of the
non-state actor to the state. See, e.g., ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 134, art. 8 (covering conduct directed or controlled by a state); id. art. 9
(covering conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities);
id. art. 11 (covering conduct acknowledged and adopted by a state as its own).
151 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 96.
152 There are “a variety of technologies that can be used to weaponize toxic
chemical agents. Munitions include bombs, submunitions, projectiles, warheads,
and spray tanks.” Chemical Weapon Delivery, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/intro/cw-deliver.htm (last modified July 24, 2011) (describing selfcontained munitions like projectiles, cartridges, mines and rockets, as well as
aircraft-delivered munitions, both of which are weaponized).
153 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xviii) (including
employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices as a war crime in international armed conflict); id. art. 8, ¶
2(b)(xvii) (including employing poison or poisoned weapons as a war crime in
international armed conflict); see also id. art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xx) (including indiscriminate
weapons use as a war crime in international armed conflict). At the Review
Conference, it was also agreed to amend Rome Statute Article 8, ¶ 2(e)(xvii)-(xviii)
to add as war crimes in non-international armed conflict “employing poison or
poisoned weapons” and “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials and devices.” See Review Conference of the Rome
Statute, Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, Resolution RC/Res.5,
RC/Res.5 (June 10, 2010) (also amending Article 8, ¶ 2(e)(xv)).
154 The International Court of Justice has defined sovereignty as “the whole
body of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the
exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States.” Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Alvarez); but see LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES, 8–10
(1995) (explaining that sovereignty should be relegated to the “shelf of history as a
relic from an earlier era”). The protection of “sovereignty” hardly seems to raise
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Third, as to the relationship of language in the definition taken
from G.A. Resolution 3314 and whether other parts of that
resolution are incorporated,155 again, this topic was extensively
discussed at negotiations, and much travaux préparatoires can be
found.156 For example, there was extensive discussion whether the
entirety of Resolution 3314 should be incorporated into the
amendment’s text or referenced, or whether only specific portions
should be incorporated or referenced.157
Some states were
specifically concerned about the language in Article 2 of Resolution
3314 suggesting extensive leeway for the Security Council to
determine that an act is not aggression,158 and Article 4, which
makes clear that the list of covered acts in Resolution 3314 was
open-ended, and could be expanded upon by the Security
Council.159 Accordingly, a decision was made to utilize only
specific portions of Resolution 3314—as reflected in the second
sentence of Article 8 bis, paragraph 2, and the list that follows.
Thus, to answer Glennon’s question: “[i]s [all of] Resolution 3314

difficult issues, and was not much debated at least at meetings of the Special
Working Group. There was some earlier debate in the Preparatory Commission
about the term, as not all proposals incorporated it. See, e.g., Proposal submitted by
Guatemala on document PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2, Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Feb.
26–Mar. 9, 2001 & Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 2001, PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.3 (Sept. 26,
2001); Proposal submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania,
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Preparatory Commission for the
International
Criminal
Court,
Sept.
24–Oct.
5,
2001,
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add.1 (Aug. 27, 2001); see also, e.g., E-mail from
Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.
155 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 97–98 (discussing the consequences of
incorporating or not incorporating Resolution 3314).
156 See generally THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17.
157 See, e.g., id. at 10; see also id. at 101, ¶¶ 14–16; id. at 116, ¶¶38–43.
158 Article 2 states:
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the
Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not
be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact
that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
159 Article 4 states: “The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the
Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the
provisions of the Charter.” Id. art. 4.
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in effect incorporated by reference?”160—the clearest answer is:
most likely no.161
Furthermore, as to Glennon’s statement that “the Security
Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under
the provisions of the Charter,”162 frankly, the Assembly of States
Parties cannot tell the Security Council what is or is not aggression;
it does not have that competence. The Security Council’s power
emanates from the U.N Charter.163 Thus, the Security Council may
in the future determine that other acts constitute aggression—
perhaps it will deem a cyber-attack to constitute aggression;
however, if it were to make a referral to the ICC on that basis, the
issue would be subject to de novo ICC review,164 which likely would
result in a more conservative ruling that a cyber-attack is not
“armed force” and/or is not a “manifest” Charter violation, and
therefore cannot be the basis for a crime of aggression conviction
under the Rome Statute.

Glennon, supra note 1, at 97.
Some earlier draft language suggested the entire Resolution would be
incorporated. This ran into heavy opposition because Article 4 would have made
the definition possibly dependent on retroactive post-crime Security Council
determinations. The opposition died down when the reference moved to the
second sentence of the paragraph, because (a) it could be interpreted as a mere
reference, and (b) because the first sentence served as a sufficiently clear
limitation. But the reference to Resolution 3314 was also an accommodation to
those who did not want, or claimed not to want, a partial use of Resolution 3314.
See E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36. Some might still argue
that Article 8 bis should be interpreted in light of the whole of Resolution 3314,
but, given that 8 bis will be a provision of criminal law, any interpretation
(particularly of paragraph 4 of Resolution 3314) would need to keep that in mind.
See E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64.
162 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97.
163 U.N. Charter art. 39.
164 The definition is quite explicit that the ICC will make an independent
evaluation. The amendment states: “A determination of an act of aggression by
an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings
under this Statute.” New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 4. This provision was
seen as extremely important for preserving the ICC’s judicial independence, and
protecting the rights of the accused by maintaining the presumption of innocence
and the burden of proof upon the prosecution. See, e.g., June 2006 Princeton
Meeting, THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 151, ¶ 71 (“Many participants
voiced a strong preference for a determination [by an outside organ] that was
open for review by the Court . . . to safeguard the defendant’s right to due
process. The Prosecutor would bear the burden of proof regarding all elements of
the crime, including the existence of an act of aggression . . . .”).
160
161
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As to Glennon’s assertion that the current definition is
“identical to coverage of the definition included in the Charter,”165
that is incorrect. He quotes language from G.A. Resolution 3314
that “nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter . . . .”166 That is
necessarily the case; the General Assembly has no power to change
the scope of the U.N. Charter. But that does not mean the current
definition is identical to what is covered by the Charter. The
current definition is for purposes of the ICC; the Security Council
makes determinations of what constitutes a “threat to the peace,
breach of peace or act of aggression” under Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter. Again, State Parties have no ability to tell the Security
Council what criteria to use in making its determinations, and
whatever definition is contained in the Rome Statute cannot
change the U.N. Charter.167
Glennon also contradicts himself when he first describes the list
of acts in paragraphs 2(a) through (g) as “exhaustive,”168 but later
states “[o]ne can only guess” if the list is exhaustive.169 Again,
there was much debate on this topic (the author remembers it
occurring at both the U.N. and Princeton) as to whether the list of
acts in paragraph 2 would be considered “open-ended” or “closedended,” and much travaux préparatoires may be found.170 (Under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the judges would
only consider this travaux if they find the treaty language to be
“ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a result which is manifestly
Glennon, supra note 1, at 97.
Id.
167 This is not in contradiction with the argument in Section 2.1.1 that the
definition of the crime of aggression should be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the U.N. Charter. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. This is so in
order to avoid conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Charter. In the case of
such a conflict, it is the Charter that would prevail. Thus, the crime of aggression
cannot alter the U.N. Charter, and if it were seen as inconsistent with the Charter,
it is the Charter that would prevail. See U.N. Charter art. 103.
168 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97.
169 Id. at 98.
170 With an “open list,” the acts listed in subsections (a)-(g) would be
illustrative of acts of aggression, and “sufficiently open to cover future forms of
aggression.” See June 2008 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra
note 17, at 89, ¶ 75. Those who favored a “closed list” expressed concerns that the
principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege could be violated by an open list.
See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 8, 10-11.
165
166
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absurd or unreasonable.”)171 Ultimately, it was resolved to
consider the list “semi-open” or “semi-closed”172 in that it is not
closed, but any other act would need to meet the other qualifiers in
the definition, which effectively “closes” the list. Whereas a fully
“open” list would be problematic as providing insufficient notice
of what other acts might be covered, a semi-open list (with a
chapeau that closes it) should not be.173 Ultimately, these issues
will become ones of construction for the ICC judges, based on
statutory language, aided by travaux préparatoires, if they choose.174
At minimum, there should be no notice problems as to the acts
enumerated in subparagraphs (a)-(g), which should cover most
situations. The possibility of “competing interpretations” as to
language simply does not mean that something cannot be a
crime.175
Finally, Glennon takes issue that an “act” of aggression and not
a “war” of aggression was covered.176 That issue was also

171 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, art. 32
(supplementary means of interpretation).
172 See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 11.
173 It is worth noting that the crime against humanity of “other inhumane
acts” has been upheld many times at the international level without any express
statutory articulation of what these other acts might be. See Trahan, ICTR Digest,
supra note 59, at 142-46 (citing cases). As explained by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda:

The crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ encompasses acts not specifically
listed as crimes against humanity, but which are nevertheless of
comparable nature, character, gravity and seriousness to the enumerated
acts in sub-articles (a) to (h) of Article 3. The inclusion of a residual
category of crimes in Article 3 recognizes the difficulty in creating an
exhaustive list of criminal conduct and the need for flexibility in the
law’s response.
Trahan, ICTR Digest supra note 59, at 142 (citing Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No.
ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgement, ¶ 527 (Sept. 12, 2006)). See also id. (citing Prosecutor v.
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A, Judgement, ¶ 716 (Jan. 22, 2004)) (similar); id.
(citing Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement, ¶ 931 (Dec. 1,
2003)) (similar).
174 If a definition were really in conflict with the principle of legality, such a
problem could not be overcome by juridical interpretation. That does not appear
to be the situation here.
175 See Hurd, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that Glennon “seems to be saying that
any definition of aggression would be open to competing interpretations,” but if
that were the proper criteria “all definitions are naturally flawed.”).
176 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.
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extensively debated during the years of negotiations177—
negotiations that the U.S. (probably unwisely) chose not to attend.
Many states believed that if only full-scale war were covered, that
would set too high a threshold; most expressed the view that the
definition should cover uses of armed force short of full-scale
war.178 Thus, it was decided that the definition would cover state
“acts” of aggression, but with a threshold that any such “act”
would still needed to constitute a “manifest” violation of the
Charter to be the crime of aggression.179 Glennon’s citing the fear
that any “use of force” will be covered180 is misplaced; only acts
meeting all of the statutory language would be covered, including
satisfying the “manifest” qualifier.181
2.2.5. Glennon’s Perceived Ambiguities in the Definition of “Crime
of Aggression”
Glennon’s final critiques of the definition concern wording in
paragraph 1 of Article 8bis, the “crime of aggression.” He
criticizes: (1) the alleged vagueness and overbreadth of the words
“planning” and “preparation”; and (2) the alleged vagueness of
what constitutes a “manifest” Charter violation.182 Again, the
“crime of aggression” is defined as the “planning, preparation,
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a
State, of an act of aggression, which, by its character, gravity and
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.”183

177 See, e.g., June 2006 SWGCA meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note
17, at 144, ¶¶ 21–24.
178 See, e.g., id. (reflecting the issue of whether only a full-scale “war” or lesser
forms of aggression should be covered). The latter approach was agreed upon.
179 See supra Section 2.2.2 (discussing the “manifest” qualifier).
180 Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.
181 In addition, Understanding 6 now also states that aggression covers only
“the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.” See New Def.
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6.
182 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98–102 (articulating the discrepancies,
inconsistencies, and major issues concerning the alleged inadequate definition for
the crime of aggression).
183 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
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Glennon correctly notes that the crime of aggression “can only
be committed by political and military leaders”184—namely,
leaders “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State.”185 He then argues
that the words “planning” and “preparation” are too broad in that
they “encompass a wide range of political and military activity.”186
Yet, these words do not appear in isolation. “Planning” and
“preparation” would only be covered when committed: (i) by
someone “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State”; (ii) as to a state act
of aggression that actually occurs; and (iii) which constitutes a
“manifest” Charter violation. So when Glennon argues that
“preparation” would cover procurement of “healthcare, housing,
retirement, and social services for military personnel and their
families,”187 he totally misses the mark. Such activities hardly
constitute “preparation” for an act of aggression, and are unlikely
to be done by someone “in a position effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”188
Furthermore, such activities would not satisfy the mens rea

Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.
New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1. Article 25, ¶ 3 is also being amended
to add: “In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall
apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State.” See id. ¶ 5.
186 Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.
187 Id. at 99.
188 Glennon additionally suggests that personnel from defense intelligence
agencies could be covered. See id. (asserting that “diplomats,” “legislators,” and
“intelligence agencies” all play a role in initiating armed conflict). Few such
personnel are likely to constitute persons “in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.” Even then,
there would also need to be an actual state act of aggression, which also
constitutes a “manifest” Charter violation. But it is also unclear why individuals
involved in providing intelligence should necessarily be insulated from criminal
exposure if all the other elements are met. Cf. Jennifer Trahan, A Critical Guide to
the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment: Genocide Against the Kurds, 30 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 305 (2009) (discussing the cases against Sabir Abd al-Aziz al-Douri and Farhan
Mutlaq al-Jaburi, who were directors in Iraq’s Military Intelligence Service, and
were convicted for involvement in the chemical and conventional weapons
bombardment of the Iraqi Kurds in the 1988 Anfal campaign, which some
estimate caused 180,000 fatalities).
184
185

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/1

01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/18/2012 2:58 PM

MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF AGRESSION

949

requirements of the Rome Statute,189 nor Element 4 of the elements
of the crime of aggression.190
Similarly, Glennon discusses the drawing up of plans for
possible invasions and contingency plans, for instance, responding
to the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles (“ICBM”) by the
Soviet Union or “plans to bomb Baghdad prior to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait,” as if they might be covered.191 First, the
elements of the crime of aggression,192 as well as the existence of
paragraph 2 (requiring an act of state of aggression), make it fairly

189 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (requiring intent and knowledge for
responsibility); see also id. art. 32 (excluding responsibility for a mistake of fact or
mistake of law if it negates the mental elements required by the crime).
190 The elements of the crime of aggression were also agreed upon at the
Kampala Review Conference. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
Amendments to the Elements of Crimes, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex II, RC/Res.6
(June 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def. Elements], art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶ 3.
A more interesting question that Roger Clark poses is whether industrialists
could be covered. Although it was proposed that the definition cover those who
“shape and influence,” rather than those who “exercise control over or . . . direct”
the political or military action of a State—which might have clarified the matter—
that more expansive formulation was not adopted. Roger S. Clark, Amendments to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the first Review
Conference on the Court, 2 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 689, 697 (2010).
191 Glennon, supra note 1, at 99.
192 The elements of the crime of aggression are as follows:

1.

The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act
of aggression.

2.

The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of the
State which committed the act of aggression.

3.

The act of aggression—the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations—was committed.

4.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations.

5.

The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale,
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.

6.

The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established such a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations.

New Def. Elements, supra note 190, art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶¶ 1–6.
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clear that an act of aggression must actually occur for there to be
the crime of aggression.193 Thus, contingency planning for an
attack that does not occur (responding to a Soviet launch of ICBMs),
would not be covered. Contingency planning for self-defense to
ICBM strikes, or collective self-defense of Kuwait, furthermore,
would constitute planning for self-defense and not the crime of
aggression.194 Glennon is again creating red-herrings.
Finally, he argues that the line-drawing for the number of
military and political leaders to be covered is “anything but
bright.”195 Is there such bright line-drawing for other ICC crimes,
or crimes adjudicated by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) or the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)? For command responsibility, is
there advanced clarity as to precisely which or how many
superiors will be covered? For individual responsibility for
“ordering” crimes, is there precise clarity which superiors might
issue such orders or how many will be prosecuted? Is there
193 There was extensive debate during negotiations as to whether there had to
be an actual act of aggression. During discussion of the Elements of the Crime it
became very clear that states wanted to include only crimes where the act by the
state had actually been committed. E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra
note 36. While the text of the elements is not necessarily determinative, there are
a number of reasons that point away from covering “attempted” state acts of
aggression: (i) the threshold requirement of a “manifest” Charter violation; (ii)
paragraph 4 of Article 15 bis (the Court may . . . exercise jurisdiction over a crime
of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party”)
(emphasis added); (iii) the text of the Elements; (iv) the travaux préparatoires; and
(v) that inclusion of “attempt” as a form of individual criminal responsibility
refers to the individual accused’s role and not “attempt” by the state. See Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 25 (individual criminal responsibility); E-mail from Jutta
Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.
194 See supra Section 2.2.1 (explaining that self-defense, which is permitted
under U.N. Charter Article 51, is not covered by the crime of aggression).
Furthermore, the definition will of course not apply retroactively to any of these
situations. The Rome Statute’s mens rea requirements as well as Element 3 of the
Elements of the Crime of Aggression are also unlikely to be met. See Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (requiring intent and knowledge); New Def. Elements,
supra note 190, art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶ 3.
195 Glennon, supra note 1, at 99. Glennon’s suggestion that “hundreds of U.S.
legislators and military leaders” could hypothetically be covered, id. at 73, totally
misconstrues how the leadership clause is designed to operate. Delegations never
expressed intent to cover hundreds of individuals; the understanding was quite to
the contrary: only a few individuals would be covered at the top leadership level.
Such an understanding is also in line with the ICC’s capacity and practice, which
to date has involved issuance of only a few warrants in each situation country.
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absolute precision how extensive the parameters of “participation”
in a “joint criminal enterprise” are? No, the ICC, ICTY and ICTR
Statutes do not answer these questions. The elements of what
constitute superior responsibility, ordering and “participation” in a
“joint criminal enterprise” have, however, been fully articulated by
the ICTY and ICTR judges through case law.196 So too here; there
will be some issues left to the ICC judges. There is no reason that
they cannot construe and develop coherent case law on the
parameters of “preparation” and “planning,” and what precisely is
required to show whether a leader is “in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a
State.” Of course, the judges will not be writing on a blank slate
either; the judges will have Nuremberg, Tokyo and Control
Council Law No. 10 jurisprudence to draw upon, as well as ICTY
and ICTR jurisprudence.197
Finally, Glennon—who in earlier discussion disregarded the
“manifest” requirement198—argues that it is too unclear to be used
196 Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at Chapters IV–V (setting forth ICTR
case law on individual and command responsibility); see id. at Chapters V–VI
(setting forth ICTY case law on individual and command responsibility).
197 There is ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence as to what constitutes “planning.”
Under ICTR jurisprudence, for example: “The actus reus of ‘planning’ requires that
one or more persons design the criminal conduct constituting one or more
statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.” Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 479 (Nov. 28, 2007). The individual’s involvement
must substantially contribute to the crime. “It is sufficient to demonstrate that the
planning was a factor substantially contributing to [the] criminal conduct. The
mens rea for [planning] entails the intent to plan the commission of a crime or, at a
minimum, the awareness of substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed
in the execution of the acts or omissions planned.” Id. (citations omitted). Similar
requirements can be found under ICTY case law. See Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra
note 59, at 353–55 (for ICTY case law on the elements of “planning”).
Glennon also argues that the definition is too vague because it has not defined
terms such as “annexation” or “force.” Glennon, supra note 1, at 110. First, as he
noted, the relevant term is “armed force” not “force,” so it is that term the judges
will construe. No doubt, absurd and academic hypotheticals could be crafted, but
to this author, what constitutes “armed force,” would seem rather obvious; to the
extent there are “grey areas,” they would not qualify, as that would not constitute
a “manifest” Charter violation. See Section 2.2.2 supra (discussing the “manifest”
qualifier which would exclude grey areas); see also supra note 124 (discussing
additional reasons for jurisprudential caution in unclear cases). Similarly,
“annexation” appears to be a fairly straightforward concept, as in Iraq’s 1991
annexation of Kuwait. To the extent a state is in doubt as to whether its actions
constitute “annexation,” it could attempt to obtain Security Council authorization
for its actions.
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in making determinations as to the crime of aggression.199 What
the manifest requirement does, as explained above, is set a
threshold.200 Other ICC crimes have similar thresholds: genocide
is only committed when there is intent to destroy in whole or in
part a substantial part of a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group.201 Crimes against humanity are only committed when there
is a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.202
War crimes before the ICC will be prosecuted “particularly when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.”203 The parameters of these thresholds
are not found in statutory language, but in the case law.204
As to the precise parameters of such terms, one should also keep in mind that
when the ICTY and ICTR started adjudicating cases of genocide, they had little
guidance, but had to develop case law on what is (1) “intent” (2) to “destroy” (3)
“in whole or in part” (4) a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (5) “as
such,” and (6) the components of the underlying crimes of genocide, and (7) the
parameters of all the forms of individual and command responsibility. See, e.g.,
Hurd, supra note 1, at 4 (“The law against genocide is equally vague [as the
aggression definition] and yet it has been successfully prosecuted by international
tribunals.”). There is, of course, now, robust case law on the elements of genocide.
See Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 144–92 (ICTY case law on genocide);
Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 15–82 (ICTR case law on genocide). But
when the ad hoc tribunals commenced their work, this did not exist. So too with
the crime of aggression: perhaps we do not have a complete understanding of the
precise parameters of “armed force” or “annexation,” but some work necessarily
must be left to the judges. If it were to become apparent to the ASP in the future
that certain terms within the aggression definition need to be further defined,
States Parties could achieve that by further statutory amendment or amendment
to the elements of the crime. (This Article does not discuss each situation Glennon
mentions in his article; the failure by this author to discuss a particular situation
does not imply this author’s acceptance of his arguments.)
198 See supra Section 2.2.2.
199 Glennon, supra note 1, at 100–02.
200 See supra Section 2.2.2.
201 See Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 27–28 (describing ICTR cases
applying the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at
158–59 (describing ICTY cases applying the substantial part requirement).
202 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note
84, art. 3; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7, ¶ 1.
203 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 1.
204 See Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 27–28 (describing ICTR cases on
the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 158–59
(describing ICTY cases on the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTR Digest,
supra note 59, at 83–92 (describing ICTR cases on “widespread” and “systematic”);
Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 213–221 (describing ICTY cases on
“widespread” and “systematic”).
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International criminal law does not require absolute precision of all
parameters for something to be a crime. For example, several ICC
war crimes apply to the targeting of “civilians,”205 but that term is
not defined in the Rome Statute or the elements of crimes, even
though, in the context of armed conflict, it is not always apparent
who is a “civilian.”206 Clearly the existence of ambiguities in
terminology does not prevent the targeting of civilians from being
a war crime. Some wording must necessarily be interpreted by the
judges.207
Glennon also discusses several complicated situations where
the United States has responded to terrorist attacks, or against
countries suspected of harboring terrorists, through the use of
force, such as U.S. bombing of targets in Libya in response to the
bombing of a Berlin nightclub in 1986.208 These indeed are difficult
scenarios because the question implicated is quite profound: is
military force a proper response to terrorism or should such

205 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(i) (listing “[i]ntentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” as a war crime in an international
armed conflict); id. art. 8, ¶ 2 (e)(i) (listing “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct
part in hostilities” as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict).
206 Someone who initially was a civilian may become a combatant by taking
up arms and engaging in hostilities. Likewise, someone who was a combatant
could retire or become incapacitated (hors de combat) and lose combatant status.
When armed conflict involves persons fighting out of uniform, making these
distinctions becomes even more complex.
207 Furthermore, as explained above, the judges have express guidance here:
The requirement of a “manifest violation” has to consider the “character, gravity
and scale” of the incursion. This mandates examination of at least two very
different criteria: (a) gravity and scale go to the size of the trans-border incursion,
and (b) “character” goes to why armed force is used. See supra Section 2.2.2.
Significantly, the definition connects these words with an “and,” so one would
need to consider both the size of the incursion as well as its character. The
importance of all three criteria (character, gravity and scale) is further emphasized
by Understanding 7 (proposed and negotiated by the U.S. at Kampala). New Def.
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 7 (emphasizing that the three criteria must be
sufficient to justify the “manifest” determination).
208 Glennon, supra note 1, at 101. Other examples Glennon raises are U.S.
drone missile attacks against targets in Pakistan; U.S. air strikes against
Afghanistan and Sudan following the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania; and surprise air attacks in 1998 by the U.S. under the Clinton
Administration against six sites in Afghanistan and one in Sudan. Id. at 92.
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incidents be treated as the crime of terrorism?209 Vast numbers of
articles have been written by legal scholars on this complex
subject.210 While the international legal community is grappling
with the proper legal framework for responding to terrorism
(whether under the laws of war or as an international crime), this
author will suggest that such examples, which again are
hypothetical because the definition will not apply retroactively or
to U.S. actions, would most likely not constitute “manifest” Charter
violations.211 As noted above, the word “manifest” is designed to

209 Prior to the attacks of 9/11 (and to some extent, afterwards), most such
incidents were treated under the criminal law framework, with warrants issued,
arrests made, and prosecutions (at least within the U.S.) before federal courts. See
RICHARD ZABEL & JAMES BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLSpursuit-justice.pdf (discussing the ability of U.S. courts to try international
terrorism cases); Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different
Approaches, 8 NEW ENG. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. Ann. 215 (2002) (surveying and
discussing international terrorism conventions).
Subsequent to 9/11, the Security Council implicitly recognized the right of the
United States to utilize self-defense. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 90; S.C. Res.
1373, supra note 90. Thus, primarily a military framework has been used by the
United States in countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, with
utilization of the Geneva Conventions (or parts of them) and use of military
commission trials at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Jennifer
Trahan, Procedures for Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They
Satisfy International and Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 780 (2007)
(discussing some of the concerns with such military commission trials).
210 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2005) (addressing
whether the United States is, or was, fighting a Global War on Terror); Gabor
Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the War
on Terror, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55 (2003) (arguing that international
humanitarian law should be applied in situations of armed conflict). Some of the
questions at issue include: “If this is a legitimate ‘war’ [against terror], who is the
enemy? When did such a war commence—on September 11, 2001, or prior
thereto? And when will such a war cease—or will it continue indefinitely,
allowing the United States to apprehend suspected terrorists worldwide
indefinitely?” Trahan, Terrorism Conventions, supra note 209, at 790. But see, e.g.,
John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 209-15
(2004) (asserting that the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda qualifies as war, which
justifies American use of military force).
211 This author, however, does not imply that all responses to terrorism
should necessarily be deemed acceptable under the U.N. Charter or beyond the
scope of legal scrutiny.
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exclude “borderline cases”212 or those “falling within a grey
area.”213 Because of the legal uncertainty as to the parameters of
what some have referred to as the “Global War on Terror”
(“GWOT”) and whether the laws of war may properly apply
beyond what appears to be a conventional battlefield—or whether
beyond a conventional battlefield, criminal law should apply214—
we are probably in a legal “grey” area, which suggests against
prosecution.215 This again illustrates the somewhat conservative
nature of the definition of the crime.
2.3. The Agreement on the Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
over the Crime of Aggression Successfully Resolves the Role of the
U.N. Security Council as to the Crime
Glennon’s final major concern pertains to the role of the U.N.
Security Council vis-à-vis ICC adjudications of the crime of
aggression.216 At the time he was writing, there were two major
competing positions: (1) that the Security Council necessarily must
be involved in determining whether a state had committed an “act
of aggression” before the ICC could adjudicate the crime of
aggression; and (2) a quite different view that to have the Security
Council (a political body) play such an exclusive role would
undermine the independence of the ICC (a judicial institution), and
that the ICC is quite capable of determining for itself whether a
state has committed an “act of aggression” in the course of
adjudicating the crime of aggression. These issues had been
contentiously debated over the years of the negotiations. (Other
proposals, since rejected, included involving the International
Court of Justice or the U.N. General Assembly in the initial
212 February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17,
at 51, ¶ 13.
213
June 2008 SWGCA Meeting in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at
87, ¶ 68.
214 This author would primarily endorse the latter approach and reject the
approach that the entire world may properly be considered a “battlefield” in
responding to terrorism. It might be possible, however, to apply the laws of war
not only to traditional battlefields (parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan), but also to
members of Al Qaeda or the Taliban acting elsewhere who play a role in directing
hostilities or have a “nexus” with them.
215 Additional reasons against prosecution in debatable cases are discussed
above. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
216 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102.
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determination of whether a state had committed an act of
aggression).217
Glennon presents various concerns about the dangers of
including the Security Council in making aggression referrals
(although, here, his concerns are not in fact ones states’ delegations
expressed during actual negotiations), and various concerns about
excluding the Security Council (concerns delegations did in fact
articulate).218 Most of his arguments are moot, because neither
situation has fully come to pass. As noted above, States Parties at
the ICC Review Conference (subsequent to the publication of
Glennon’s article) reached a compromise regarding the conditions
under which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression that permits, but does not mandate, Security Council
involvement.219
This compromise resolves or obviates most
problems Glennon raises.
2.3.1. The Perceived Danger of Including the Security Council in
Making Aggression Referrals
Glennon starts by raising concerns with having the Security
Council be the exclusive entity that would initiate a case by either
making a determination that an act of aggression had occurred, or
making a more generic referral to the ICC.220 Glennon argues that
because the Security Council cannot be bound by the ICC
definition, its referral would be “ex post facto,” resting purely on a
“policy judgment,”221 and amount to a “political roulette wheel.”222
He argues that a “Security Council prosecutorial predicate would
make a person criminally responsible under the Statute even though
the conduct in question constitutes . . . a crime that is not within
the jurisdiction of the court.”223 (While Glennon is assuming in this
scenario that “only” the Security Council could make such
referrals—an assumption now moot because the amendment does
217 The various competing positions on jurisdiction are described in depth in
THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, and in Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra
note 16.
218 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102.
219 See supra Section 1.2.
220 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102.
221 Id. at 103.
222 Id. at 73.
223 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
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not exclusively utilize Security Council referrals—this Article will
nonetheless examine his concerns because the Security Council,
under the jurisdictional regime agreed upon, still has the option of
making a referral under the new Article 15 ter.)224
When Glennon argues that a “Security Council prosecutorial
predicate would make a person criminally responsible,”225 Glennon
is confusing the “referral” by the Security Council and the
substantive merits determination by the ICC. Assume the Security
Council acts in some totally arbitrary way and makes an absurd
aggression referral; whether an act of aggression was committed
would be subject to full de novo review by the ICC.226 No
conviction results merely from the referral. In fact, as noted above,
the Security Council determination will in no way bind the ICC.227
Thus, if the Security Council is making a “policy judgment” in
making its referral, it would neither bind the ICC nor “make a
person criminally responsible.”228 Furthermore, because Security
Council referrals will be only one path by which an aggression case
may commence—the ICC may also initiate cases after State Party
referral or proprio motu action229—concerns of having a political
body play such a role regarding a judicial institution (a concern
expressed during negotiations) are certainly lessened.
To the extent Glennon suggests that the Security Council might
make a referral in one case (case A) and not another (case B), when
both situations appear to involve similar acts of aggression, and the
decision would be “arbitrary” or “discriminatory,”230 the problem
is minimized because an aggression case may be triggered by two
other methods—State Party referral or prosecutor initiation.231 If
See supra Section 1.2.
Glennon, supra note 1, at 104 (emphasis added).
226 See supra note 164.
227 Id.
228 Glennon, supra note 1, at 104.
229 See supra Section 1.2.
230 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 103 (noting the Council’s broad leeway to
render decisions and arguing that the Council’s decisions are ultimate policy
judgments based on an ad hoc and subjective basis).
231 Furthermore, there are other cases in which an intervening decision has to
be taken before a prosecution may begin; for instance, a diplomat can be
prosecuted if there is a waiver of immunity, and such waiver is discretionary. See
E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64. Thus, the fact of an intervening decision
(even one that is discretionary) hardly shows procedural infirmity.
224
225
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Glennon is really troubled by the Security Council’s discretion to
act in some situations and not others, would he condemn the
Security Council’s referral of the Darfur and Libya situations232
because other referrals have not have been made?233 The Security
Council’s referral ability, of course, was enshrined in the original
Rome Statute,234 and not the Kampala amendment.235
Admittedly, the field of international justice is not fully a level
playing field. Why did the Security Council create an international
tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda (the ICTR), but not in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”)? Why is there a hybrid
tribunal for crimes committed in Cambodia (the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)),236 but not in
Afghanistan? One might argue that this situation is “arbitrary” or
“discriminatory” (this author would argue it is political), but this
kind of unequal enforcement of international criminal law
presently exists.237 This situation, however, does not suggest there
should be no ICTR and ECCC prosecutions because there are no
corollary tribunals for the DRC or Afghanistan. Nor does it
suggest that there was anything wrong with the Security Council’s
two ICC referrals.
Rather, it suggests the need for more
232 See S/RES/1593 (2005), supra note 45, ¶ 1 (resolving to refer the situation
in Darfur since July 2002 to the ICC Prosecutor); see also S/RES/1970 (2011), supra
note 46, ¶ 4 (referring the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since February
2011 to the ICC Prosecutor).
233 For example, the Security Council has not made an ICC referral of the
situation in Syria, despite high estimates of protesters being killed. See Khaled
Yacoub Oweis, Assad Forces Fire on Protesters Across Syria, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2011,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-syriaidUSTRE76T02020110802 (reporting on the lack of agreement amongst the
Security Council regarding a resolution on the Syria uprising).
234 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b) (granting ICC jurisdiction where
the Security Council refers a situation involving a relevant crime to the ICC
Prosecutor).
235 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
236 The ECCC was created by agreement between the U.N. and the
Government of Cambodia. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian
Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 41723.
237 Parallels exist in the field of human rights, which has three regional
human rights courts (the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, and the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights),
but no human rights courts in other regions and no global human rights court.
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internationalized judicial institutions, such as international or
hybrid tribunals, and more focus on the rebuilding of national
judiciaries to enable additional prosecutions. At the ICC level, it
suggests one should strive for universal ratification of the Rome
Statute, and, absent universal ratification, vigilant Security Council
action to refer all appropriate situations to the ICC.
2.3.2. The Perceived Danger of Excluding the Security Council in
Making Aggression Referrals
Glennon next argues that excluding the Security Council
entirely from making aggression referrals—another possible option
when he wrote his article, but one that is now moot—would also
be problematic, because it would run afoul of the U.N. Charter.238
Glennon (correctly) notes that under Article 39 of the Charter, the
Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”239
This led some states to argue that the Security Council necessarily
had to be involved, or be the only body involved, in the
determination of an “act of aggression,” but other states have
argued that Article 39 concerns Chapter VII enforcement actions
and does not necessarily apply in the context of criminal
adjudications.240
To a fair degree, these issues are moot. Whereas it might have
been possible to exclude the Security Council from playing any
role in aggression referrals, for instance, under the theory that its
powers are for purposes of Chapter VII enforcement and not
criminal adjudication, such exclusion certainly ran a risk that the
Rome Statute would be seen as contradicting the U.N. Charter. As
noted above, in the event of contradiction, Article 103 of the
Charter provides that the Charter would prevail.241 Moreover,
238 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 104 (arguing that there are three possible
ways to interpret Article 39, none of which provide for the exclusion of the
Security Council’s role).
239 U.N. Charter art. 39.
240 Glennon has labeled the various approaches “concurrent,” “preemptive”
and “plenary” Security Council power to determine the existence of aggression,
but this terminology was not used in the actual negotiations and will not be
adopted here. Glennon, supra note 1, at 104–05.
241 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. States may also have chosen to
include a role for the Security Council out of more pragmatic, and not purely
legal, considerations. See E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.
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States Parties to the Rome Statute have not made Security Council
determinations a necessary pre-requisite for ICC adjudication,
which was seen to risk undermining the ICC’s independence by
giving a political body too much control over the docket of a
judicial institution. The result reached—that the Security Council
is one possible route to trigger ICC cases but there are other
routes—was generally perceived as both respecting the Security
Council’s role and preserving the ICC’s independence, and
appears the best possible solution.
Glennon also raises the concern that the ICC and Security
Council might come to opposite conclusions, suggesting this
would lead to aspersions on the fact-finding or law-finding
competence of the other institution.242 First, because different
bodies within the international system do have different
competences, the potential for inconsistent determinations within
the international legal system in fact already exists. The ICTY and
ICC have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, but the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) may adjudicate claims of
genocide between states in civil cases; yet, there is no mechanism
to harmonize these determinations. The same potential for conflict
exists between the ICJ and Security Council, which both may
examine boundary disputes.243 Inconsistencies are a consequence
of the diffuse nature of the international legal system, which
involves various international bodies, with no overall appellate
mechanism to harmonize results. Yet, the potential for inconsistent
rulings has never been seen as reason for these institutions not to
exercise jurisdiction.244

242 Glennon, supra note 1, at 106 (arguing about the danger of contradictory
findings).
243 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad),
Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (adjudicating territorial claims between Chad and
Libya over the Ouzou strip).
244 The Security Council can also minimize such potentials for inconsistency
by (i) making general referrals that do not mention the state act of aggression; (ii)
utilizing the term “threat to the peace” to trigger Chapter VII action without
opining on whether there has been an act of aggression in legal terms; and (iii) if
there is ambiguity as to which state has committed an act of aggression, making a
referral that does not specify which state is the aggressor state. E-mail from Pål
Wrange, supra note 64. An alternative view might be that the quite distant danger
that a Security Council determination would be reviewed by a judicial institution
could be a good thing. Id. This author views the issue slightly differently; the
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Second, the potential for conflict appears overstated: the ICC
and Security Council will conduct different evaluations. The ICC
will adjudicate the crime of aggression using the definition agreed
upon at the Review Conference. The Security Council will act
under its competence as to international peace and security,
applying Article 39 for purposes of taking action under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. As to Glennon’s suggestion that
inconsistencies between the bodies would lead to aspersions on
“the fact-finding or law-finding competence of the other,” the
Security Council does not conduct express fact-finding or lawfinding in the way a judicial body does. Its resolutions are far less
detailed than a criminal judgment, and, as explained above, the
Security Council will not necessarily apply the ICC definition. The
Security Council has historically rarely determined that an act of
aggression has actually occurred,245 and even if it makes an ICC
aggression referral, it certainly has the option of making the
referral without expressly finding that aggression occurred.246
Finally, Glennon concludes that an appropriate solution is only
achievable with a U.N. Charter amendment247—a concern this
author does not recollect being articulated over the more than ten
years of aggression negotiations. Glennon is concerned both that
the ICC could “get the jump” on the Security Council, and that the
Security Council could make a determination opposite one earlier

Security Council and ICC will be making different determinations, and thus the
ICC will not sit in review of the Security Council.
245 See id.
246 Article 15 ter specifies no requirement that the Security Council make any
express finding that there has been a state act of aggression. See New Def., supra
note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 1 (providing that the Security Council may make a referral
pursuant to Rome Statute art. 13(b)—which permits it to refer a “situation” to the
court). See also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b) (allowing the Security
Council to refer “situations” to the Prosecutor and giving the International
Criminal Court jurisdiction over those matters).
247 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 107. Glennon also seems to confuse the
amendment procedures, suggesting that Rome Statute Articles 121(4) and 121(5)
would both be utilized simultaneously. See id. at 113. In fact, virtually every
proposal (and the ultimate Amendment) used one provision or the other, but not
both. Here again, Glennon’s lack of attention to the actual negotiations is telling.
While the so-called ABS Proposal (by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland) made at
the Review Conference did involve using both provisions, they would have
pertained to different Rome Statute amendments. For the text of the ABS
Proposal, see Trahan, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
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made by the ICC.248 He concludes that the Security Council would
need a given period when it exclusively could act, but that would
require a Charter amendment. First, the Review Conference
outcome gives the Security Council the first opportunity to act in
making a referral for an exclusive six month period,249 yet that has
been achieved by an amendment to the Rome Statute, not a
Charter amendment. In terms of the Security Council making a
determination opposite one earlier made by the ICC, it is true that
the Security Council could stop an ICC aggression case that was
proceeding, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.250 Yet an Article
16 decision by the Security Council could indicate that it viewed
the proceedings as jeopardizing international peace and security,
and not necessarily indicate a determination in substance contrary
to the ICC’s view on whether a state act of aggression had
occurred. Furthermore, the ability of the Security Council to defer
a proceeding was something agreed upon in Rome, not
Kampala.251 Lastly, Glennon worries that the ICC could go ahead
with a prosecution despite an “implicit or explicit finding by the
Security Council that no aggression had occurred.”252 This
probably would be difficult because the Prosecutor would have to
show a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, and the
Court might not find that burden met in the wake of a Security
Council determination that aggression did not occur—which the
Court could consider, although it is not binding.253 Moreover, if
that were to occur, the Security Council would always have the
option of using its deferral powers and stop the ICC from
proceeding.254

See Glennon, supra note 1, at 107.
See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 6–8 (stating that a Prosecutor can
only proceed in investigating a crime of aggression six months after the
Prosecutor notifies the Security Council of plans to investigate).
250 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council . . . has requested the Court to that effect . . . .”).
251 See supra text accompanying note 73.
252 Glennon, supra note 1, at 109.
253 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
254 In fact, a Security Council finding that no aggression has occurred, if it
cites Rome Statute Article 16, would probably constitute a pre-emptive deferral
that would stop the Court from acting in the first place. See supra note 250 and
accompanying text.
248
249
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Thus, Glennon’s concerns about the role of the Security
Council, which generally assume the Security Council has no role
or an exclusive role in aggression referrals, are to a fair extent
moot. The agreement reached, which will permit a Security
Council role but not mandate one, has created a solution that is
both consistent with the U.N. Charter and preserves the ICC’s
independence.
3.

WHY THE AGREEMENT HAS NOT FAILED

At least eighty-four delegations from States Parties to the Rome
Statute, who ultimately agreed by consensus vote at the Review
Conference to the amendment on the crime of aggression, clearly
view the amendment as a success. As Glennon admits, there is no
reason why aggression “or any other crime, cannot be defined with
sufficient specificity . . . .”255 This final Section addresses Glennon’s
final arguments why agreement on the definition has purportedly
failed.
Glennon argues that the reason agreement on the crime of
aggression has proven elusive is “cultural and political,” in that the
world sees itself in terms of states “that see themselves historically
as victims of aggression” and “states that do not see themselves as
historic victims of aggression,” and the views of these basic groups
conflict making the “zone of potential agreement” between them
“miniscule.”256 Since Glennon wrote his article, that agreement was
reached, thereby mooting the crux of his argument. Glennon,
however, is probably right to say that states see themselves either
as potential victims of aggression or as potential aggressor states,
but this diversity of views did not prevent agreement from being
reached. How states view themselves may impact: (a) whether a
State Party ratifies the aggression amendment (States Parties that
see themselves as potential victim states, or as strong proponents
of the rule of law and supporters of the ICC can be expected to
ratify); (b) whether a State Party exercises an opt out declaration
(States Parties that see themselves as potential aggressor states
might be tempted to do so); or (c) whether a state continues to

255 Glennon, supra note 1, at 109. This statement contradicts Glennon’s earlier
criticism of those who “believe the crime of aggression is perforce capable of
being defined.” Id. at 72.
256 Glennon, supra note 1, at 111.
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remain outside the Rome Statute system, and is able to utilize the
complete aggression jurisdiction exemption for non-States Parties
(again, states that see themselves as potential aggressor states
might be tempted to do so).257 The jurisdictional agreement
reached does not create a level playing field and uniform
application of the rule of law (but neither did the original Rome
Statute, whereby States Parties and non-States Parties are treated
quite differently in terms of jurisdiction), but it was probably the
best jurisdictional regime that could be negotiated under the
circumstances.
Glennon’s final lament is that the ICC risks developing into a
potentially powerful international force “with interests antithetical
to those of the United States.”258 The core focus of the ICC to date
has been the prosecution of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity where the worst mass crimes occur.259 This
country should have no trouble supporting such prosecutions.
Indeed, statements by U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Stephen J.
Rapp suggest that is the case.260 The United States should not view
257 This analysis assumes states are primarily concerned about the protection
of their leaders from prosecution. One could envision a very different scenario
where the state is concerned about becoming an aggressor state and therefore
ratifies the amendment without an opt-out declaration to prevent aggression by
its future leaders. E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.
258 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112.
259 The ICC, for example, is focusing its cases on atrocity crime situations
such as large-scale use of child soldiers and horrific gender crimes of mass sexual
violence. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 12 (Jan. 27, 2007),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF
(proceeding
against
Lubanga, a former rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of Congo, tried for
conscripting, enlisting, and using child soldiers); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges. ¶¶
71-72 & 210-212 (June 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc699541.pdf (trying Bemba, alleged President and Commander in Chief of the
MLC, for crimes against humanity and war crimes, including rape).
260 Ambassador Rapp has stated:

[W]e recognized in March [2010] when we participated in the Assembly
of States Parties in New York, it’s in our interest to support those [ICC]
prosecutions—not at this time as a member of the ICC, but in kind with
assistance as long as it’s consistent with our law. And at the same time
that we support those prosecutions, also work on the whole of the
international justice system, the key part of which is that that is below
the level of the international system, the massive amount of work that
needs to be done at the national level.
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developments regarding the crime of aggression as “antithetical”
to its interests; no country should have an interest in aggressive
use of force. Nonetheless, this argument is largely academic
because, as explained above, the United States, as a non-State
Party, will be exempt from aggression jurisdiction.261 Glennon
concludes (as if approvingly) that “senior U.S. officials will
nonetheless be safe because the United States is not a party to the
Rome Statute,” characterizing the ICC as having the potential to be
a “ruinous train wreck.”262 Is it really praiseworthy that U.S.
officials should be exempt from violating a core foundational norm
of the U.N. system—Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the aggressive use
of force? Is the ICC, with skilled judges selected by 121 States
Parties (including some close U.S. allies) and a plethora of
procedural protections to ensure fair trials,263 really a potentially
Special Briefing at U.S. Dep’t of State with Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep’t of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Engagement With the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently
Concluded Review Conference, in D.C. (June 15, 2010), transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm
(emphasis
added).
261 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
262 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112–113.
263 The Rome Statute requires the following comprehensive fair trial
protections, including all the due process protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights,
except for trial by jury:
(i)

the right to remain silent or to not testify against oneself (art. 67,
¶ 1(g));

(ii) the right against self-incrimination (arts. 54, ¶ 1(a); 67, ¶ 1(g));
(iii) the right to cross-examine witnesses (art. 67, ¶ 1(e));
(iv) the right to be tried without undue delay (art. 67);
(v) the protection against double jeopardy (art. 20);
(vi) the right to be present at trial (arts. 63; 67, ¶ 1; 67, ¶ 1(c));
(vii) the presumption of innocence (art. 66);
(viii)the right to assistance of counsel (art. 67; ¶ 1(b), (d));
(ix) the right to a written statement of charges (art. 61, ¶ 3);
(x) the right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses (art.
67, ¶ 1(e));
(xi) the prohibition against ex post facto crimes (art. 22);
(xii) the freedom from warrantless arrest and search (arts. 57, ¶ 3;
58);
(xiii)the ability to exclude illegally obtained evidence (art. 69, ¶ 7)).
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“ruinous train wreck”? Why does Glennon suggest the ICC is
dominated “by interests antithetical to those of the United
States”?264 Can he possibly mean to imply that the United States
has more in common with non-States Parties such as China, Russia,
Myanmar, and Iran rather than States Parties such as Canada, the
U.K., Australia, and Japan?
This author sees things very
differently. The Assembly of States Parties should be commended
for their historic accomplishment, which with time has the
potential to change the international landscape by discouraging
unnecessary uses of force and bringing the international
community one step closer to full utilization of the collective
system of international peace and security envisioned under the
U.N. Charter.
4. CONCLUSION
Despite technical errors and ignorance of the extensive
negotiating history of the crime of aggression, Glennon in his
article is asking interesting questions, ones that should have been
debated within U.S. Government and academic circles long before
now. That they were not debated appears largely to have been a
result of the Bush Administration’s decision not to attend the
negotiations of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression—a squandered opportunity to shape the definition on
a very significant issue. That more attention was not paid perhaps
stemmed from an erroneous assumption that the negotiations
would not be successful; indeed, for a while, the negotiations
appeared squarely mired down in the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction, while progress was still being made on the definition.
Those who did not take the work of the Special Working Group
seriously made a miscalculation. By the time the U.S. delegation
(under the Obama Administration) started attending the
negotiations,265 the definition and elements of the crime were

The above-listed fair trial rights compilation is found in AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, SAFEGUARDS IN THE ROME STATUTE
AGAINST ABUSE OF THE COURT TO HARASS AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS AND CIVILIAN
OFFICIALS, 7 (2001), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Safeguards.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
264 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112.
265 This author urged the United States to attend such negotiations. See Letter
from Am. Branch of the Int’l Law Assn. Int’l Criminal Court Comm. to Harold H.
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essentially complete, leaving the United States with no real role to
play in their drafting.266

Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-atLarge for War Crimes, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://ilaamericanbranch.org/reports/2010-03-19_ICC_Letter.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2012)
(detailing the negotiations on the crime of aggression and differentiating between
closed issues where it appeared too late for the United States to play an active role
in negotiations and open issues on which the United States still had room to
engage).
266 The best the United States could achieve under the circumstances was
what it did—concentrate on adding “Understandings” to the definition, four of
which were adopted at the Review Conference, and engage in negotiations as to
the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. The Understandings that the United
States endorsed and which were adopted provide:
Domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
4.

It is understood that the amendments that address the
definition of the act of aggression and the crime of aggression
do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments
shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than
this Statute.

5.

It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as
creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction
with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State.

Other understandings
6.

It is understood that aggression is the most serious and
dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a
determination whether an act of aggression has been committed
requires consideration of all the circumstances of each
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.

7.

It is understood that in establishing whether an act of
aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and
scale must be sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination.
No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the
manifest standard by itself.

New Def. Understandings, supra note 109. The Understandings in paragraphs 4–
5 were already included in the proposed Understandings in an earlier Conference
Room paper. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, [Draft] Understandings
Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on
the Crime of Aggression, Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression,
RC/WGCA/1/Rev.1, Annex III, ¶ 4 bis (June 10, 2010).
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Yet, while Glennon is asking provocative and interesting
questions, it is also important to get the technical details correct.
There is no point in reading paragraph 2 of the definition without
the context of paragraph 1 (as he does), or ignoring the negotiating
history with respect to the definition of the crime. Nor do his
arguments that “planning” social security for military members
might be the crime of aggression267 help the debate, since they so
obviously miss the mark. His arguments that self-defense and
Chapter VII authorized enforcement actions fall within the term
“act of aggression” also completely fail since they are authorized
under the U.N. Charter and certainly permissible.268 Finally, the
fear-mongering aspect of his article has to be dispelled: (i) past
U.S. actions will not be covered because the definition is not
retroactive; (ii) future U.S. actions will not be covered while the
United States is a non-State Party; (iii) even if the United States
were to join the Rome Statute for purposes of the crimes of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could still
exercise an “opt out” declaration and avoid ICC aggression
referrals triggered by State Party or proprio motu action; and (iv) as
a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States
already is in a position to ensure there is no Security Council
aggression (or other) referral as to action on its territory or by its
nationals. One can debate whether this ironclad exclusion of the
United States from ICC aggression jurisdiction is a good thing or
not—some states no doubt view it as reprehensible in placing the
United States above the rule of law as to this crime—but this is
how the amendment is structured.269 It is time to accurately and
Glennon, supra note 1, at 99.
See supra Section 2.2.1 (discussing Glennon’s distortion of what constitutes
an act of aggression).
269 The U.S. delegation in Kampala, in its closing remarks delivered by State
Dep’t Legal Adviser Harold H. Koh, made some suggestion of wanting to revisit
some of the issues concluded at the Review Conference. Harold H. Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Closing Intervention at the Review Conference of the
International Criminal Court (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/
s/l/releases/remarks/143218.htm. Yet, in terms of avoiding ICC jurisdiction
over U.S. nationals (assuming that was a major goal of the delegation), the United
States clearly achieved that result. See Wrange, Of Power and Justice, supra note
126, at 946 (stating that “a reluctance to submit its armed forces to international
criminal law scrutiny may not be far-fetched for a country with wide exposure”).
If the United States is truly still concerned with aggression exposure, the real
risk is arguably not from the ICC, but the possibility of national court aggression
267
268
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soberly assess the achievements of the ICC definition of the crime
of aggression and the strengths (and weaknesses) of the conditions
for the exercise of jurisdiction agreed upon at the ICC Review
Conference. Glennon’s article, while raising interesting questions,
does not accomplish this.

prosecutions. If that is the case, the United States might consider whether to
advocate that in future amendments a primacy regime be created for the crime of
aggression, so that national court aggression prosecutions might at least be tried
before the ICC, which, with all its checks and balances and protection of
defendants’ fair trial rights, could well be the preferable forum for such
adjudications.
See Trahan, supra note 109 (discussing concerns with
complementarity and the crime of aggression).
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